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An Integrated Model of Attitude Theory and Applicant Faking Behavior

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Abstract

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Applicant faking behavior (AFB) on personality measures has been a long-standing challenge for both researchers and practitioners. Applicant faking behavior is widely defined as a deceptive act that is intended to create a favorable impression (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). The research in this area has evolved with heightened focus on bolstering its theoretical foundation and establishing a consistent and effective operationalization of AFB. This research utilizes archival data from a within-subject design with a sample of job applicants; a procedure that has been recognized as the "gold standard" of the AFB literature (Ryan & Boyce, 2006).

Structural Equation Modelling resulted in partial support for the hypothesized relationships and the adoption of The Composite Model of the Attitude-Behavior Relation (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) for explaining AFB. The results of this study provided valuable insights into the dynamics between potential antecedents of applicant faking behavior. Three primary conclusions for this study include: (1) Habit of Deception, as currently measured, is not a viable direct or indirect antecedent of AFB, (2) in addition to Attitude toward AFB, Attitude toward Personality Measures should be included in the AFB story, and (3) Idealistic Ethical Position, as many previously theorized, is a significant predictor

of Intention to Fake. Implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research are discussed.

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Introduction

For every 10 minutes of conversation, people tell approximately three lies (Smith, 2004). In fact, most of us engage in deception every day (Depaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Dwyer, & Epstien, 1996). It should then be no surprise that deception occurs in personnel selection contexts. In order to obtain a desired job, many applicants are willing to deceive their way to the top of their respective applicant pool. This specific form of deception – referred to in the remaining of the paper as applicant faking behavior (AFB) - is an applicant's conscious self-misrepresentation to create a favorable impression when completing a personality measure (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). Applicant faking on non-cognitive measures has been a long standing concern for both practitioners and researchers (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). There is considerable evidence that not only *can* applicants fake (Hough & Paullin, 1994; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998; Ryan & Sackett, 1987; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), but mounting evidence that they *do* fake (Donovan, Dwight & Hurtz, 2003; Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Griffith & Converse, 2012), and that faking negatively impacts personnel selection (Griffith et al., 2007; Griffith, Lee, Peterson, & Zickar, 2011; Saldago, 2016).

Much of early faking research focused its attention on finding a "silver bullet" or "cure" for the problem. Now, with an increased mindfulness for the complexity of the behavior, research has directed its focus toward a strong theoretical understanding of the phenomenon prior to attempts at applied solutions.

Over two decades old, faking theory has focused largely on situational-, trait-, and personality-based factors, but many questions remain unresolved. One under-addressed component regards the attitudinal antecedents that drive AFB. This study aims to provide additional theoretical development, and tests of the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) in the context of AFB. The purpose of this dissertation is not to present a new model per se, but rather to present an alternative framework for future research to build on and integrate within existing theory. This dissertation, then, investigates how the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation can inform and integrate with modern AFB theory.

The Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation was initially developed as an integration of existing attitude theory, namely the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; (Ajzen, 1985). Theory of Planned Behavior suggests that intention to perform a particular behavior can be predicted by the combination of an individual's attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control toward that behavior. TPB has received extensive empirical support for a variety of behaviors such as exercise (Nguyen, Potvin, & Otis (1997), dieting (Conner, Kirk, Cade, & Barrett, 2003), environmental behavior (2005), weight control (McConnon et al., 2012), and mobile learning readiness (Cheon, Lee, Crooks, & Song (2012). Further support for TPB's utility in predicting behavior has been established in meta-analyses (Armitrage & Conner, 2001; Rivis, Sheeran, and Armitage, 2009). Relevant to this dissertation, support has been found in TPB's prediction of AFB

using lab based methodologies (Grieve & McSwiggan, 2014; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland and Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, Thornton, 2006). These studies tested the integration of numerous faking-related variables in addition to those represented in TPB (e.g. ability to fake, conscientiousness, moral obligation norm, ethical idealism, warning of a lie scale with TPB). Studies using variables unique to TPB demonstrated mixed results, in part due to their thin theoretical support and the inconsistent operationalization of variables (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). This dissertation contribute to the literature by providing a consistent, empirically substantiated, operationalization of faking behavior and in-depth theoretical support in a field-based setting.

Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggested the addition of *habit* and *self-identity outcomes* to TPB for predicting behavior. These variables are particularly applicable to AFB. Self-identity outcomes are relevant because of the ethical dilemma experienced by fakers. As faking is a form of deception (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006), a person more inclined to deceive in any given situation may be more likely to fake than a person who is less inclined.

Regarding habit, AFB research suggests the existence of different types of fakers, including one described as more spontaneous (Griffith, Lee, Peterson, & Zickar, 2011). A habit for deception may predict this observed faking variance, where even the presence of small cues may trigger the behavior. In addition to these variables, Eagly and Chaiken suggested the inclusion of attitude as two separate constructs: attitude toward behavior and attitude toward target. This

reconceptualization provides support for a behavior (e.g. AFB) being perceived more positively due to the attitude toward the target (e.g. attitude toward selection measures).

This study uses Eagly and Chaiken's theoretical approach within the context of faking behavior (see Figure 1). This model, like TPB, suggests that AFB is the outcome of one's intention to perform AFB. However, unlike TPB's original conceptualization, AFB is also influenced by the attitude toward AFB and habits of deception. Additionally, the intention to fake is directly influenced by attitudes toward AFB, normative outcomes of AFB and idealistic ethical position. Lastly, attitude toward AFB is suggested to be directly influenced by habits of deception, attitude toward applicant personality measures, utilitarian outcomes of AFB, normative outcomes of AFB, and idealistic ethical position. This dissertation investigates a novel model that incorporates aspects of the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation to determine its value for integration with AFB theory.

Contributions

The primary contribution of this paper is to introduce a novel integration of attitude theory with AFB. Doing so provides a new path for future research; a testable avenue that has strong theory and foundations in psychology – until recently a characteristic lacking in the nascent theoretical faking literature. Further exploring the attitude perspective increases the understanding of AFB; bolstering the theoretical foundation on which systematic research with a consistent

operationalization and measurement of AFB may follow. This research is also one of the first theoretical AFB studies to use real job applicant data and thus, is the first to use field data to explore the integration of attitude theory with AFB.

Exploring this integration has implications for practice as well. The proposed model may pave the way for AFB interventions in the same way as TPB has been widely used on various behaviors (e.g. quitting smoking and improved exercise behavior). With an increased understanding for the antecedents of AFB provided by this model, methods to deter or mitigate the negative effects of faking can be established. With a more comprehensive understanding of the variables that influence AFB, more informed actions can be taken to manipulate AFB.

Overview

This dissertation explored an integration of attitude theory and AFB. In this paper I first review personality measures, their susceptibility to deception and summarize the most relevant AFB theory. I then review the relationship between attitude and behavior with a focus on TPB, and Eagly and Chaiken's (1993) theoretical adaptation. I then review the existing AFB literature that integrates attitude theory before summarizing the study's hypotheses. Finally, I describe the methods used to test the hypotheses, and present the analytical approach for the study.

Personality Testing

Personality testing is a multibillion dollar industry (Ziegler, McCann, and Roberts, 2012). It helps academic administrations accept the students that best fit their universities, psychiatrists to prescribe effective medicines, and grade schools to determine the most appropriate support path to maximize growth in children. One of the primary uses of personality tests is in the personnel selection setting where they are used to help organizations select the right applicants for employment and promotion. The success of personality testing lies solely on the accuracy of its assessment and the validity of the subsequent predictions. The more accurate a personality measure can inform an organization of an applicant's standing on non-cognitive traits (e.g. conscientiousness), the more an organization can confidently predict future applicant performance and fit within their company. It is this inference that ultimately determines whether or not the individual will be hired or passed by for a more suitable applicant. In short, personality testing is valuable to the extent that its results accurately depict the characteristics of the test taker and their behavior in the future.

A considerable amount of research supports the notion that personality measures can predict job performance across occupations (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Ones & Viswesvaran, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006; Salgado, 2002; Tett & Christiansen, 2007). This conventional wisdom has led to wide-spread use of personality measures as a tool for employee selection. In addition to task performance, organizations benefit from other pro-

social behaviors predicted by personality measures. Research supports growing recognition for the importance of contextual performance in modern work environments. While cognitive ability predicts task performance, personality tests demonstrate superior prediction for contextual performance (Borman, Penner, Allen & Motowidlo, 2001; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). Personality measures predict day-to-day behavioral tendencies and are more likely to assess typical performance or the "will-do" aspects of job performance more so than the "can-do" aspects (Marcus, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 2007). Thus, personality measures compliment cognitive assessments and add significant incremental validity to selection batteries in assessing the most suitable employees (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Including non-cognitive measures in selection batteries also provides a more well-rounded examination of applicants, enhancing the probability for correct selection during the decision–making process. In addition, research suggests that personality tests have minimal adverse impact in comparison to measures of cognitive ability (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Sackett, Burns, & Callahan, 1989; Sackett & Wilk, 1994). Lastly, personality tests are relatively easy and inexpensive to administer, making them attractive for selection processes, especially to businesses recruiting for positions with large applicant pools. These advantages have also led to the adoption of personality measures for increasingly popular unproctored internet-based applicant screening (Tippins, 2009).

The benefits and popularity of personality measures is clear; however, some criticism of personality measures for the use of personnel selection has been offered in the literature. Researchers have stated that the criterion validity estimates associated with these selection tools have been disappointing (Morgeson et al., 2007). Personality measures often have lower criterion related validities when compared to cognitive ability tests which have long been considered an essential part of personnel selection due to their predictive power (Motowidlo, Borman, & Schmitt, 1997). The common criticism that is most relevant to this study, is personality measures' susceptibility to manipulation and deception (Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 1996; Hough & Oswald, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). This deception has the potential to compromise the accuracy and prediction of personality testing. Deception within the context of personality measurement is often specifically referred to as applicant faking behavior (AFB).

Deception

To introduce the concept of deception, I will review the evolution of the literature and present a contemporary definition. In 1981, Krauss defined deception as, "an act that is intended to foster in another person a belief or understanding which the deceiver considers to be false." This definition implies that deception is 1) an act (whether that be a vocalization or behavior) and 2) is intended to create a false belief or understanding. Krauss's definition is robust in that it incorporates an aspect of intention, an aspect that Mitchell's (1986) definition leaves out: "a false communication that tends to benefit the communicator." Mitchell's definition does

augment Krauss's delineation by adding that the communicator is a beneficiary of their deception. We may assume that with a beneficial outcome that this definition also suggests that a deceiver is motivated by the outcome. Ekman (1992) defined deception as, "a deliberate choice to mislead a target without giving any notification of the intent to do so." This definition emphasizes that deception requires a deliberate choice, also implying intention. Unlike previous definitions, Ekman implies that one is not deceiving if they have prepared the target for deception. Through example, this implication supports that magicians are not deceiving because their audience is primed to expect deception. This definition also does not provide insight into the possibility that intentional deception can be unsuccessful. A detail that Vrij (2001) incorporates in his definition: "a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue." This definition summarizes three aspects: (1) the deceiver must believe what they are communicating is false; (2) there must not be any forewarning of the deception; (3) the deception may or may not be successful in convincing the target. These three aspects make-up the most comprehensive definition of deception to date, and are important parameters involved in deceptions within AFB. For this reason, Vrij's (2001) modern definition of deception is used for the remainder of the paper.

Deception, particularly in western culture, is strongly associated with a lack of morals or integrity (Bok, 1978). And yet deception is all around us; we participate in it and we are the targets of it. Research suggests that the typical

American adult admits to telling at least one lie every 24 hours (Serota, Levine, & Boster, 2010). And yet we know that most people are not villainous in nature. Although some of our deception is motivated by harmful intentions and consequences, for the most part deception is harmless, minor, and serves a communicative function (DePaulo et al., 1996). At times our deception even serves to benefit the target (e.g. white lies). Deception is an adaptive characteristic (Smith, 2004) that has evolved over time to help us manipulate people and situations for our own or others' benefit (Bond & Robinson, 1988; Smith, 2007).

The source of deception that is most concerning in employee personality assessment is exhibited from the applicant who holds the end goal of receiving a job offer. When responding to personality measures, applicants have an opportunity to manipulate the selection process by responding in a way that is more desirable to the selector than it is an honest reflection of their personality.

To accomplish their end-goal, a faker's deception must be successful. There are many variables that influence whether any deception will be successful and the extent to which an individual is willing to deceive. These variables apply within the context of AFB, as well. Once an individual determines that AFB can help obtain their goal, like any deceiver, the faker evaluates the target and the situation.

From the perspective of a faker, their target is dependent on the applicant's intentions, knowledge of the selection process, and moral justifications. Is the faker's target the personality measure itself, the administrator of the measure, the person who will ultimately analyze and score the measure, or the organization?

Regardless the applicant is not likely to have a long standing or deep relationship with the target. Emotion and its relation to morality can be a strong deterrent of deception. Research suggests that deceivers are less likely to feel the emotional response of guilt when the target is impersonal or totally anonymous (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Tyler & Feldman, 2004). Therefore, a deceiver is less likely to feel guilty if their target is not someone or something they are familiar with. In consideration of the faker's target or potential targets, it is not likely that guilt will play a role in preventing that individual from deciding to deceive on personality measures. For the faker, not only is the target someone they don't know, the target isn't clear. The target may even be perceived to be an object (e.g. the measure, the organization) rather than a person, further dehumanizing any negative outcome of the deception.

Another emotional deterrent for a deceiver stems from whether or not they will get caught. By analyzing the target and possibly the situation, the faker must decide if an attempt at deception is worth it based on the potential for, and consequences of being found out. For example, if the deceiver perceives the target as difficult to mislead and believes the consequences of getting caught are severe, then they will be less likely to deceive. The reality of a faker's scenario is that organizations are unlikely to catch those who deceive, but even if they could, the consequences would be trivial. As Griffith and McDaniel (2006) put it, "perhaps they will not get the job, but their name will not appear on a national registry of known deceivers." Therefore, the perception of the faker hinges largely on their

knowledge of the selection process. For most fakers, any potential negative outcomes will be perceived as minimal.

The last variable to consider in respect to a target's influence on effective deception is Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The central concept of this theory postulates that a deceiver must know and understand what their target knows in order to architect deception in a way that has the greatest chance of being perceived by the target as honest. In the case of the applicant, Theory of Mind may play a crucial role when an applicant is completing a personality measure. The applicant needs to understand the organization's "ideal employee" profile to accurately and effectively deceive. Unfortunately for organizations, most personality measures consist of transparent items where the "ideal" answer is fairly clear. Because it is easy for the applicant to understand the make-up of an ideal employee and common personality items are highly transparent, the underlying task of Theory of Mind may be relatively simple for a faker.

In addition, applicants may approach personality assessment differently, depending on their perception of the situation. Applicants may be more likely to deceive if they believe that other applicants are deceiving. If they are under this impression, by telling the truth, they are putting themselves at a disadvantage. Previous research has suggested that 74% of applicants believe that other applicants were using deception on personality measures (English, Griffith, Graseck, & Steelman, 2005). This situational perspective and the considerations regarding the target, provide initial support that the selection process is vulnerable to AFB. AFB

would be difficult for applicants if: their target was someone close to them, someone who could catch and punish them, it was difficult to understand the applied-for position, and if the situation was not perceived to favor the deceptive. However, just the opposite is the case: the target is unclear and often anonymous, is unable to catch them, is easy to deceive, and it may seem like everyone is advancing their scores through faking. Typically in high stakes settings deception is risky and emotionally and cognitively taxing, but the selection scenario removes almost all of these barriers, leading Rosse and colleagues (1998, p. 635) to describe the applicant setting as an "almost an ideal setting for dissimulation" in particular, AFB (McFarland & Ryan, 2000).

Applicant Faking Behavior

Callahan (2004) has suggested that we live in a "cheating culture," where deceptive behavior for the sake of goal acquisition is the norm. By considering the viewpoint of applicant fakers, it is not difficult to understand the reasons behind their actions. We are inundated with stories of prominent members of our culture who deceive to gain competitive advantage (e.g. professional athletes using performance enhancement drugs). Given the competitive nature of U.S. culture and perceived societal demands, some may argue that it is unfair to expect people to always act honestly; thus, there is no reason to expect different behavior from applicants.

Applicant faking is an applicant's conscious self-misrepresentation to create a favorable impression when completing a personality measure (Goffin & Boyd,

2009). Unlike response styles that are consistent over time across items and scales, faking is a response set that is influenced by the situational demand of the applicant setting, and personal characteristics.

Concern regarding applicant faking on non-cognitive measures has been a present almost as long as the measures have existed (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). Unlike intelligence tests which have verifiable right and wrong answers, applicants can exert some influence on their scores when responding to personality tests. Research has reliably demonstrated that applicants are capable of faking when instructed to do so. A meta-analysis conducted by Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) found that participants were able to increase their scores by approximately one half standard deviation. The same study also showed that in between subject designs, all dimensions of the Big Five personality questionnaire were susceptible to faking with effect sizes ranging from .48 for agreeableness to .65 for openness to experience. Additionally, effect sizes for within subject designs ranged from .47 for agreeableness to .89 for conscientiousness.

There is mounting evidence that not only *can* applicants fake (Hough & Paullin, 1994; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998; Ryan & Sackett, 1987; and Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), but they *do* fake (Griffith & Converse, 2012; Griffith et al., 2007). In 2007, Griffith et al. conducted an experiment that explored whether applicants actually elevate their scores in an applicant setting. Participants completed a personality measure of conscientiousness as applicants, and one month later completed that same measure with an instructional set asking them to

respond to the scale as honestly as possible. The results indicated that a significant number of applicants faked their scores in the applicant condition. Griffith et al. stated that at least 31 percent of applicants were categorized as faking. This prevalence of faking is consistent with findings from other research (Donovan et al. 2003; Griffith & Converse, 2012). Some research findings have supported estimates upwards of 40 to 50 percent fakers (Donovan et al. 2014; O'Connell et al. 2011). In a summary and synthesis of the faking literature Griffith and Converse (2012) suggested that in most U.S. settings approximately 30% (±10%) of applicants fake. This finding has been supported by a variety of investigative methods including: using non-motivated scores from research and job applicant settings, measuring non-motivated scores at various lengths (1 month to 1 year) after the motivated condition, and the use of counter-balance experimental manipulations, controlling for potential order effects.

In 2006, Birkeland and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis comparing job applicant scores (a motivated setting) to non-job applicant scores (unmotivated). Across all jobs types, applicants scores significantly higher than their non-applicant counterparts in extraversion (d=.11), emotional stability (d=.44), conscientiousness (d=.45), and openness (d=.13). They also found that personality dimensions that were particularly relevant to the focal job were most vulnerable to faking. In a different study, as many as 30 – 50% of applicants self-reported engaging in faking behavior (Donovan et al., 2003).

While the existence of faking in applicant samples has been disputed by some researchers (e.g. Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007), tangible evidence of the

behavior is now the norm. New strategies and products continue to surface with the purpose of informing applicants how to fake their selection tests. One such example is a book titled; *Ace the Corporate Personality Test* (Hoffman, 2000), which provides a tutorial for applicants on how to manipulate non-cognitive employment tests. Thus conventional wisdom now suggests that applicant faking on personality tests is indeed a reality (Dilchert, Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006), and there is little reason to suspect that this tendency is abating.

The extent to which faking effects the validity of measures continues to be hotly debated, with some suggesting that faking introduces construct-irrelevant variance (Rosse et al., 1998). The addition of this unwanted variance has the potential to harm measurement efforts, and negatively impact hiring decisions. In personnel selection the purpose of administering measures and analyzing applicant responses is to improve hiring decisions by choosing the individuals who are most likely to perform well on the job. To the extent that the administration of a selection measure leads to improved hiring outcomes we can demonstrate some evidence of validity. For example, when an applicant fakes on a measure of extraversion, their resulting test score not only represents their individual differences in the focal trait, but also introduces variance associated with individual differences in faking behavior. Therefore, the more fakers that exist in an applicant pool, the more measurement variance will be due to faking rather than extraversion (the intended construct). In the extreme scenario where everyone in the applicant pool is faking on the extraversion measure, the organization is no longer hiring

based on who is most extraverted, rather, who is most willing and able to fake (Ziegler et al., 2012). This phenomenon decreases construct validity; and unless faking is a better predictor of on-the job performance than extraversion is, it should decrease criterion validity coefficients as well.

The criterion-related validity coefficient is one of the most highly referenced statistics when determining the practical value of a selection tool. Therefore, it is no surprise that much of the applicant response behavior literature has examined the impact of faking on criterion related validity. When an individual successfully fakes a personality measure, they may rise in the distribution of scores, making them more likely to be hired. The fakers that are hired may in turn displace honest applicants. Thus, a business that hires a faker is actually selecting an individual who possesses less of the desired trait than honest applicants. Therefore, said business is hiring employees lower on the traits associated with successful job performance, and applicants with good job fit are unfairly rejected. Counter intuitively, as selection ratios become more favorable to the organization more fakers will be hired, increasing the chances hiring decisions will yield false positives. This dynamic result is what researchers call hiring discrepancies (Peterson, Griffith, & Converse, 2009). Griffith et al. (2007) found that with a selection ratio of .5, 31% of applicants were discrepant hires. At a .1 selection ratio, this percentage rose to 66%. Thus, research suggest that fakers are causing more error in the predictor distribution (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003) and are changing rank ordering, especially at the top of the distribution. This may

result in disturbances in hiring decision-making, especially in smaller selection ratios (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998).

Although changes in rank-order seem likely, results examining the effects of faking on criterion-related coefficients have been inconsistent. As suggested by Rosse et al. (1998), the correlation coefficient insensitivity to rank order changes may mislead researchers to believe the effects of faking are minimal when substantial rank-order changes are occurring.

However, an alternative explanation may provide insight on the mixed results of previous research. Much of the research investigating faking's effect on criterion-related validity used social desirability measures as a proxy for faking behavior to correct personality scores or partial out the effects of social desirability (SD) from correlations between personality measures and job performance. These studies typically find little improvement in criterion-related validity (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Ones et al., 1996; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006), and have suggested that faking is little more than a nuisance variable. SD scales were designed to detect fakers by using items in which the desirable response is relatively infrequent in a normative sample (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). Recent research suggests, however, that these measures are largely ineffective (see Griffith & Peterson, 2008). Therefore studies using measures of SD as proxies of faking behavior should be observed with skepticism along with their conclusions regarding faking's influence on validity.

Other studies using different operational definitions of faking have found consistent negative effects on criterion related validity, particularly studies that operationalize faking as within subject score change (Douglas et al., 1996; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Peterson et al. 2011). While many of these studies are lab studies and have been criticized for the lack of generalizability, similar results are now emerging from actual applicant settings (Peterson et al., 2011). Using a within-subjects design, Donavan, Dwight, and Schneider (2014) assessed faking and its influence on hiring decisions for a pharmaceutical sales position. Using a self-report measure of dispositional goal orientation pre and post hire, Donovan et al. classified about half of the participants as fakers on at least one of the three goal orientation scales. Once hired, the employees were measured by training performance and again 5 months later using on-the-job sales data. Results indicate that fakers performed less favorably than non-fakers. Results also indicate that faking had a negative impact on the psychometric properties of the measure. Specifically, internal consistencies were lower in the honest setting (post-hire) than the motivated setting (pre-hire). Additionally, the measurements factor structure was supported by data collected during the honest setting and was not during the motivated setting. These results support faking's negative effects on selection measures' construct and criterion validity using a within-subjects design in an actual organizational setting.

Although evidence is mounting in support for faking's potential to decrease the criterion related validity coefficient, some within-subjects designs (Ellingson et

al. 2007 and Hogan et al. 2007) have suggested otherwise. In regards to the reason behind these discrepant findings, firstly, both Ellingson et al. and Hogan et al. used personality measures with dichotomous response options in their operationalization of faking. This item format is likely to provide less opportunity for faking because fakers can only respond to the "correct" response option (Donovan et al. 2014). In contrast, with continuous Likert response options, fakers have the opportunity to indicate the extent to which they possess the trait being measured. Secondly, Hogan et al. conclusion that faking is uncommon is predicated on the assumption that applicants would be less motivated the first time they applied for position than they would the second time, after they had been rejected. Without having support for this assumption, one may just as easily assume that motivations would be the same in these two settings; and therefore, insufficient for measuring faking (Berry & Sackett, 2009).

Although research to this point has provided less than conclusive results as to the effects of faking on criterion-related validity, a growing body of literature provides evidence that faking behavior impacts hiring decisions and the predictive validity of personality measures. In summary, research continues to provide support that AFB does occur in applicant settings and can potentially harm organizational outcomes. Thus, recognizing AFB's potential impact on personality testing warrants further examination. However, for the betterment of faking literature, theory is necessary to organize and accelerate understanding of applicant

response processes. This study integrates well-established attitude-behavior theory to further explore AFB and its primary antecedents.

Attitudes

Researchers hold varied views on the utility and morality of AFB. To some it is amoral, a conscious decision to lie for the benefit of yourself and the detriment of others (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). On the other hand, some researchers view faking as a natural behavioral response to the selection process (Ingold, Kleinman, Konig, & Melchers, 2015; Marcus, 2009) and those who are most successful at it, deserve the outcome they seek. Most researchers, however, are somewhere in between these views, with complex evaluations contingent on the status of numerous variables including faking degree, stakes, circumstance, and intention. These various evaluations were heavily debated in the 90's with the outcome of the debate suggesting that all of these views are correct to an extent. However, little research has been conducted to understand how *the applicant's* evaluations of faking can impact their faking behavior. Next, I continue this shift in perspective from taking an external viewpoint to understanding faking through the applicant lens, namely through analyzing applicant attitudes.

An attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). We can break this definition down into four parts. To be an attitude, the cognition must be a psychological tendency, implying that this is an internal state. Secondly, attitude is expressed by an evaluation: a broad descriptor encompassing cognitive,

affective, and behavioral responses. Thirdly, this evaluation is made toward a particular entity, and therefore is known by its direct connection with the attitude. Finally this evaluation can be qualified on a spectrum from favorable to un-favorable.

Although described as a tendency, attitudes do not necessarily exist in only a moment in time. Instead, attitudes are an internal state that lasts *at least* a short time. Tendency should be differentiated from dispositions. To use "disposition" would imply that *all* attitudes are relatively stable states that are long-lasting. Some attitudes carry these characteristics, however, others are malleable and short lived, particularly in instances in which they are unimportant or only recently introduced to the possessor of the attitude. Therefore, the preferred term to describe attitudes is tendency; as it fulfills the necessary generality to encompass states that are both brief and enduring.

As an evaluation, an attitude's primary conceptual role in explaining behavior lies as mediator between certain stimuli and responses. Responses are the observable expressions of an evaluation. Regardless of the type of response (e.g. a wide smile), it is informative in construing the unobservable associated evaluation (e.g. liking or approval). Evaluative responses are expressions of the extent that a person approves/disapproves, likes/dislikes, approach/avoids, etc. The attitudinal state that is assumed to underlie an evaluative response is understood to be positioned on its own continuum ranging from extremely negative to extremely

positive. In regards to AFB, varying evaluative responses yield varying patterns and degrees of AFB.

The onset of an evaluation is brought on by an attitude object. Completing the stimuli-response relationship, an evaluation is made based on an attitudinal object which often triggers an evaluative response. Attitudinal objects can vary from abstract (e.g. communism, love) to concrete (e.g. cellphone, admissions test) entities. They can also be classes of entities (e.g. electronics, selection measures). Attitude objects can also be behaviors (e.g. AFB, playing baseball) and classes of behaviors as well. Attitude objects are represented in our observations through a variety of stimuli. Understanding how attitudes emerge from responses and selection-related evaluations will inform the attitude-AFB relationship.

A stimuli that is observed, may elicit a response which expresses a certain degree of evaluation. The underlying assumption of such an occurrence is that the individual holds an attitude - described by some degree of favorability or unfavorability - toward the attitude object being represented by the class of stimuli. When specific stimuli consistently elicits a specific response from an individual, an inference of that individual's attitude toward the attitude object can be made. The stronger the attitude, the more consistent the behavior associated with that attitude will be. An attitude differentiates from personality traits and mood due to the length of time an attitude can exist, the specificity of the relationship between an attitude object's stimuli, and the evaluative responses that makes up an attitude.

A measure may prompt attitude formation for applicants. An applicant may not necessarily have a formed attitude a priori for what is being measured. If an individual perceives that it may be beneficial to have an attitude about an object they may spontaneously form one in the moment (Fazio, 1990). Therefore, an applicant may form an attitude about AFB spontaneously if they don't previously have one. Whether attitudes are developed spontaneously or not, attitudes toward an object should be a good predictor of behavior (Ajzen & Fishbien, 2005). However, easily accessible and strong attitudes are suggested to have more value than spontaneously formed attitudes at predicting behavior. If a past attitude is not strong enough to influence a situation and an attitude is not spontaneously generated, research suggests that an individual's behavior will be influenced by cues of the attitude object or the situation.

Classes of Evaluations

The evaluation of an attitude is expressed as three classes: cognition, affect, and behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007); also known as the three-component model. Cognitive evaluations are often described as beliefs, or the associations developed between the attitude object and its attributes. They are the thoughts and ideas about the attitude object and can be expressed internally or externally via verbal communication. Being evaluative also implies that the cognitive response can range from extremely negative to extremely positive. Extremely negative evaluations are less likely to be associated with positive attributes, whereas extremely positive evaluations are less likely to be associated with negative attributes. For example,

some applicants may believe that responding honestly to personality measures is to the benefit of the organization and employee fit. This belief links the attitude object (faking behavior) to a positive attribute (beneficial to employee fit).

Affective responses consist of the moods, emotions, and feelings related to an attitude object. As with cognitive responses, affective ones can also range from extremely negative to extremely positive. People who favorably evaluate an attitude object are more likely to have positive affective responses and less likely to have negative affective responses from it and vice-versa. For example, when thinking about others' AFB and its impact on fair assessment, one may have an emotional response of anger toward those individuals and/or the assessment process.

Although all evaluative responses are important to consider for AFB research, the most pertinent to this study is behavioral; specifically overt behaviors. Individuals who evaluate an attitude object favorably are more likely to foster or support it than individuals who evaluate the attitude object unfavorably. Faking on personality measures is an indication that the faker holds a favorable evaluation of deception through AFB. Behavioral responses also encompass intentions, which are not considered overt. Although an applicant may have the intention to fake, they may be unsuccessful without the ability or opportunity to fake. Like overt behavioral responses, supportive and unsupportive intentions are related to positive and negative intentions, respectively.

The three-component model has received inconsistent statistical support (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). However, the conceptualization of the model remains useful for understanding how attitudes are formed and expressed. This model is used in this study to illustrate the relation between attitudes toward AFB and the behavior itself.

The Impact of Attitudes on Behaviors

As reviewed, attitudes or tendencies to evaluate an entity with some degree of favor or disfavor, are commonly expressed in cognitive, affective and behavioral responses. People who have positive attitudes are more likely to take actions that approach or support the attitude object whereas people with negative attitudes are more likely to take actions that resist or deter the attitude object. Researchers do not, however, always expect high correlations between attitudes and behaviors because neither attitudes nor behaviors are assessed with perfect validity and attitudes are only one of many antecedents of behavior. The relationship we expect between attitudes and behaviors are of a moderate, or even small magnitude. This holds true for AFB as well. Faking is a complex behavior and addressing AFB will require more than just a silver bullet solution. The purpose of this research is not to fully predict AFB, but instead to explore a new application of a well-supported theoretical model to uncover the role attitudes play in AFB. Thus, this study reviews the attitude-behavior relationship more closely before more specifically exploring the relationship between attitudes and AFB.

Smaller correlations were often demonstrated in early research that was focused on broad attitudes such as attitudes toward ethnicities, nationalities and governmental policies. These broader attitudes are much better at predicting aggregated behaviors than a more focused behavior. For example, an attitude toward deception may have influence on a number of behaviors including lying to friends, stealing from their employer, or faking on an application. But although an attitude toward deception may influence the likelihood that these behaviors occur or do not occur, there are a number of other factors that determine their actual occurrence. For example, faking on a personality measure for a job may also be influence by how much the individual likes the job they are applying for, how many job opportunities they have, and whether they have the ability to fake successfully. A single behavior may not be a good indicator of an attitude, however the aggregate of many behaviors can be. The confounding influences from the single behavior are cancelled out upon multiple varying observations. Thus, correlations between attitudes and aggregated indices of attitude-relevant behaviors will be stronger than correlations between general attitudes and singular behaviors. This aggregation of behaviors, also known as a multiple-act criterion, is a better consequence for broad attitudes to predict (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974).

This phenomenon was later summarized by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) by stating that attitudes and behaviors should be correspondent to support strong correlations. The primary principle of correspondence theory outlines that general attitudes (e.g. attitudes toward ethnicity, religion, etc.) are good predictors of

general behaviors or aggregated behaviors. More specific attitudes, however, are better predictors of specific behaviors. In other words, the relevant attitudes and behaviors should be defined at an equivalent level of specificity. This equivalency is further broken down into four specific elements of: action, target, context, and time. The attitude and behavior should be similar in specificity on all elements. Every behavior (1) consists of a specific action (2) performed toward a target (3) in context and (4) at a time. For example, an applicant (1) fakes (2) a personality measure (3) sitting at a desk on a computer (4) the morning of February 4th. Each of these elements can range in their specificity. Therefore, a behavior can be assessed as (1) a single action or a range of actions, (2) toward a single target or a range of targets (3) in a specific context or a range of context, and (4) at a single time or a range of times.

An attitude target is more often than not distinct from an attitude object (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p 163). The attitude target, such as a personality measure in the example above, is an entity of which a behavior is directed towards. Although an attitude object can be a target (e.g. attitude toward a personality measure), it can also incorporate the same elements of behavior (action, target, context, and time). For example, an applicant will have an attitude toward AFB a personality measure using a computer in the morning.

If the object is the behavior (e.g. AFB), the target is that which the behavior is directed towards (e.g. the personality measure). When the only attitude object element specified is the target (e.g. attitude toward personality measures) all other

elements must be assumed to be all encompassing (e.g. attitude toward personality measures in consideration of all behaviors, in all contexts, and at all times). Similarly to attitudes toward targets, attitude towards behavior in which the action is the only element specified, all other elements are considered all encompassing (e.g. attitude toward AFB in consideration of all targets, in all contexts, and at all times). An attitude toward a behavior and the attitude toward the target are two different attitudes that many studies do not distinguish. This dissertation is the first AFB study to use both attitude types in the prediction of AFB.

In addition to correspondence theory, attitude research has determined conditions that maximize attitude-behavior prediction. Increased behavioral prediction occurs when an attitude is: held with confidence (as opposed to uncertainty), decisiveness (as opposed to ambivalence), is easily recalled (as opposed to difficult to recall), and is developed from direct experience (as opposed from indirect experience) (Kraus, 1995).

The Theory of Reasoned Action

Behavioral intention was the catalyst for the modern research on the attitude-behavior relationship. It was suggested that intention was the most proximal antecedent to behavior and attitudes influence behavior through intentions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). An intention is a person's motivation to put forth energy toward a behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). By stating that intention is the sole primary antecedent, their Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; See figure 3; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) only

explained planned behavior, not spontaneous behavior – which would not have intention. Additionally, this theory assumes that attitudes do not have an impact on unplanned behaviors, whether they are spontaneous or have developed habitually.

This theory focuses on attitudes toward behaviors and not toward a target (reviewed in detail below). Attitude toward behavior is one of the two primary antecedents to intentions. The second antecedent is subjective norm, or the belief an individual has regarding the extent to which their significant others (i.e. anyone who may have a perception of the individual-behavior relationship that is important to them) would or would not support the behavior. Thus, an individual's evaluation of engaging in a behavior and their belief of significant others' support for engaging in that behavior drives the individual's intention to behave. Applied to AFB, an applicant's attitude toward AFB and an applicant's perception of whether significant others would support AFB, drive the intention the applicant would have to fake. This intention drives the AFB. According to this theory, no other variables have significant influence on intentions. All other variables influence only through these primary antecedents.

The determinants of attitudes toward behaviors and subjective norms is most commonly explained by the expectancy-value framework (Vroom, 1964). An attitude is determined by beliefs of the behavior's perceived consequences. The expectancy-value model defines consequences as the product of the subjective likelihood that the act will result in a specified consequence (expectancy) and evaluation of that consequence (value). This product is multiplied with all other

expectancy x value products associated with other consequences of the behavior. Research has demonstrated that people who have high intention to behave believe that the consequence is more positive and more likely to happen in comparison to those with low intentions who believe the behavior has less positive consequences and a smaller probability of the occurrence of the consequence. Additionally, individuals with strong intentions believe there are less negative consequences with a smaller probability of occurrence whereas individuals with low intentions believe there are greater negative consequences with greater probability of occurrence. As applied to the second antecedent, subjective norm, the expectancy x value framework suggests that it is the sum of an individual's perceptions of all significant others' beliefs that the person should perform the behavior times that person's motivation to comply with all significant others' beliefs.

Applicants do not consider all subjective norms and attitudes thoroughly before calculatedly determining their intentions and then behaving. Rather, as Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) specify, the applicant would have previously developed their norms, attitudes, and intentions. In the moment of faking, they may only consciously consider one or a couple variables to establish their intention.

The Theory of Reasoned Action has been supported in a variety of research settings, such as voting (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), infant feeding practices (Manstead, Proffitt, & Smart, 1983), and purchasing prescription drugs (Brinberg & Cummings, 1983). Meta-analyses from Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw (1988) and Van den Putte (1991) reported correlations of .66 and .68 respectively,

for the predicting of intention from attitude subjective norm. These meta-analyses reported correlations of .53 and .62 respectively, for the relation between intention and behavior. It is suggested that these may be conservative estimates based on the studies inclusion of research studying not fully volitional behaviors. The Theory of Reasoned Action suggests that correlations are weaker when studying behaviors that are less volitional.

Despite widespread support, the Theory for Reasoned Action has its critics. A primary critique of the Theory of Reasoned Action comes from its predictability of behaviors that require ability and skill. The theory is limited in its predictability to simple actions that require mostly only motivation to achieve. Although previously described as relatively easy to execute, AFB does require a level of skill in ability especially in comparison to common attitude-focused research behaviors such as voting or going to church. Although these behaviors require effort, there is very little skill involved. Therefore, the Theory for Reasoned Action would not strongly predict AFB due, at least partially, to the skill and ability necessary for successful AFB. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) suggest that the individuals without enough skill to complete the behavior likely lack complete understanding of that behavior. If they lack the necessary skills, once the behavior is attempted and failed, intentions will change and better align to behavior on subsequent attempts. This point becomes at least partially moot as it applies to AFB. Most applicants, who attempt to fake, will not receive the necessary feedback to make the appropriate adjustment in intentions for future behaviors. To successfully fake, an

individual must have the ability and skill to: (1) accurately evaluate their own self-concept, (2) have an understanding of personality measures, how they work, and apply that understanding towards AFB, (3) have a strong knowledge of the job they are applying for and its requirements, (4) apply that knowledge in the interpretation of the personality measures' items in order to determine the desired response, and (5) apply these actions and knowledge appropriately to every item in each measure. These are all variables that the Theory for Reasoned Action would not account for in the prediction of behavior.

Theory of Planned Behavior

To address the critique that the Theory of Reasoned Action is limited to volitional behaviors requiring little ability and skill, Ajzen (1991) expanded on the theory by developing the TPB (See Figure 4). The TPB is meant to account for behaviors that require resources, opportunity, and skills; those more difficult to execute in comparison to the behaviors predicted by the Theory of Reasoned Action.

To account for behaviors requiring more resources, opportunity, and skill TPB introduced "perceived behavioral control" to the model. Perceived behavioral control is defined as an individual's perception of how easy or difficult the performance of the behavior of interest will be. Control beliefs, or beliefs deciding whether the individual has enough resources, opportunity, and skills necessary to perform the behavior, is suggested as the primary driver of perceived behavioral control. Perceived behavioral control impacts behavior through intentions as well

as directly. The direct relationship is concerned less with the perception but rather with the reality of the skills, opportunities, and resources necessary to perform the behavior. Ajzen (1991) uses perceived behavioral control as a proxy for actual control because of the latter's unpredictability (e.g. sickness, accidents, weather).

Ajzen (1991) reviewed twelve studies using TPB to predict various behaviors including playing video games, voting choice, shoplifting, and giving a gift. The results showed that the TPB was a better predictor for behavior and intentions than the Theory of Reasoned Action. Ajzen concluded that the TPB is a more comprehensive model, capable of predicting behaviors requiring more resources, opportunity, and skills.

Although more comprehensive, the TPB still has received criticism. First, as suggested by Eagly and Chaiken (1993), a causal link between perceived behavioral control and intentions suggests that individuals perform their behaviors for the sole reason that they are able to. This becomes especially questionable with certain behaviors. For example, although an individual has the control to vote for a politician they do not believe in or to respond randomly to a personality measure; they likely would not intend to perform these behaviors solely because they can. Secondly the TPB omits many well-supported drivers of intentions, including: morality and habit. Ajzen remains open to the possibility that additional variables added to the model could better predict certain behaviors. These variables are included in this study's hypotheses and are explained in further detail within the

section: *Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).*

Attitudes toward Targets

Many theories have built from or added to the TPB to explain behavior in its more complex forms. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) add to the discussion by proposing the inclusion of attitudes toward targets or in other words, attitudes toward the entity a behavior is directed.

Fazio's (1990) research provides the most detail on attitudes toward targets via an automatic processing model that outlines the primary mediators between attitude and behavior. This processing sequence initiates when an individual interacts with attitude objects. This automatically triggers the individual to access (without conscious effort) from memory the evaluation associated with the attitude target. When the attitude is accessed it affects the individual's perceptions of the attitude object. Upon activation of a favorable or unfavorable attitude, positive or negative attributes are assigned to the object. These assigned attributes partially make up the *definition* of the event (Fazio, 1986). Similarly to Fishbein and Ajzen, normative factors may also influence the event. Therefore, the definition of the event is comprised of normative factors and the influence of attitudes on the initial perception of the attitude object. The definition then determines behavior.

Fazio's model on the effect of attitudes on behavior has received criticism for its description of the more proximal drivers of behavior. In Fazio's model, the definition of the event is the last process before the behavior which, "simply

follows" (Fazio 1996, p. 237). Behavior is described as following the definition, "without any necessary conscious reasoning process" (Fazio, 1986, p. 237). Left under-explained are important, previously discussed variables including attitudes toward behaviors, intentions, habits, scripts, and plans. Even with these drawbacks, Fazio's model remains a complementary addition to the existing attitude theory with the inclusion of the processes through which attitude toward targets can influence behavior. This link between attitude toward targets and the highly supported TPB influenced the eventual development of Eagly and Chaiken's Attitude-Behavior Model. The attitude toward target variable has not been explored in AFB research and may provide a valuable and novel approach with additional insights into the predictors of AFB.

Relevance Principle

Relevance principal contends that activated attitudes affect behavior only if they are viewed as related and have potential as appropriate guidelines (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). An individual needs to perceive their attitude as relevant for it to affect behavior. Therefore, for an attitude to be impactful on behavior it needs to be accessible and relevant. Borgida and Campbell (1982) added that the attitude that is both accessible and relevant must not be countered by confounding considerations. For instance an applicant may perceive a personality test as unfair and often faked. This attitude may influence an individual to fake; however, this attitude may be negated by the countering consideration that AFB would make the individual feel

overwhelmingly guilty. Feeling guilty in this example, is the confounding consideration.

Relevance principle research provides explanation for how certain attitudes may impact behavior. This principle explains that the automatic processing that occurs when an individual is first presented with attitude object cues, is not, within itself, enough to impact behavior. When exploring the impact of attitudes, AFB research has only considered an applicant's attitude toward AFB, not their attitude toward the target, the personality measure. For example, if an applicant perceives personality measures as an unreliable test that most applicants fake, that applicant will likely form a negative attitude toward the behavior of taking the personality measure. However, this negative attitude toward personality measures will not impact behavior unless it is relevant and accessible. Existing theory still lacks, however, in explaining the processes involved from the moment an attitude is activated from the attitude object cues to its influence on and the eventual action of behavior. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) have started this conversation within the attitude research and this study furthers that conversation as it applies to AFB.

Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)

In 1993, Eagly and Chaiken developed a single model as a composite of the models that were based on attitude toward behavior and those based on attitudes toward targets (see figure 5). This model explains behavior's emergence from 5 key variables: attitudes toward targets, utilitarian outcomes, normative outcomes, self-

identity outcomes, and habits. Many of these, particularly habits and self-identity outcomes, aim to fill what critics of TPB thought were key omissions (e.g. Terry et al., 1990; Smith et al., 2010). Attitudes toward targets are defined as evaluations of targets of behavior. Utilitarian outcomes are the rewards and punishments that are anticipated to result from the behavior. Normative outcomes are those that regard significant others' approval or disapproval of the behavior. Self-identity outcomes are the anticipatory outcomes for one's self concept following the behavior. Lastly, Habits are defined as behaviors that are mostly automatic and do not require much conscious thought to activate.

Similar to Fazio's (1986) automatic processing model, attitude toward target has direct influence on attitude toward behavior. Attitudes toward targets do not influence behavior directly. An individual must translate their attitude toward a behavior into a behavioral option. Attitude toward a target must first influence an individual's attitude toward a behavior before action is taken. In addition, this approach explains that attitudes toward behaviors can also be influenced by habits. This is counter to TPB in that attitudes toward behavior are primarily predicted by behavioral beliefs and anticipatory outcomes. The final key deviation between Eagly and Chaiken with TPB is that normative and self-identity outcomes can have a direct impact on intentions. This relationship is similar to social norms in the Theory of Reasoned Action.

Within their attitude-behavior model, the three anticipatory outcomes for a potential behavior vary in their influence. Normative outcomes are expected to

influence AFB via the same mechanisms as proposed by TPB: through attitude toward the behavior and intention to behave. Utilitarian outcomes is proposed to influence attitude toward AFB. If an applicant believes that AFB results in positive outcomes, that applicant will be more likely to think favorably about AFB than the applicant who believes AFB will result in negative outcomes. This proposed relationship is partially supported by TPB, labelled in their model as a similar variable of perceived behavioral outcomes.

As mentioned above, a variable that is often criticized as a key omission to TPB is Morality. Morality can be defined as individual's personal perception of right and wrong. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) defend this omission by citing intention as confounding the prediction value of morality. Research has found that morality can predict intention above and beyond attitude and subjective norm (e.g. Sparks & Shepherd, 2002). Morality has been shown to play a particularly influential role in unethical behavior such as lying (Beck & Ajzen, 1991).

Eagly and Chaiken's model introduces a variable similar to morality, self-identity outcomes. These perceived outcomes are suggested to influence attitude toward AFB and intentions to fake. Self-identity outcomes are an important consideration in AFB's emergence because of the ethical dilemma experienced by fakers. Deception is often associated with having a lack of morals (Bok, 1978). When reviewing which variables had the greatest impact on intention to fake, research supports that moral conviction is the best predictor (Sieler & Kuncel, 2005). This finding is consistent with McFarland and Ryan's (2000) and Goffin and

Boyd's (2009) hypotheses that morals have influence on beliefs toward AFB. As reviewed with the above anticipatory outcomes: while making a decision, people use a mental weight-scale to balance the positives and the negatives as they try to manage their working self-concept (i.e. the way people view and perceive themselves) (Markus & Kunda, 1986). The costs attributed with a dishonest act win out only if the perceived benefits are greater than the perceived risks (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). People compare their actions to their internal norms and values as they construct and mold the cognitive schema of their moral identity (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Vivien, & Felps, 2009). Self-identity outcomes is proposed to measure the extent an individual feels that their moral identity would change if they participated in the behavior of interest

The last exogenous variable in this model is habit: "goal-directed automatic behaviors that are mentally represented" (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Habits are developed based on past behavior and its propensity of automatic triggering is largely based on the frequency of which that behavior is performed. Higher frequency leads to greater familiarity which encourages automatic processing. There is research that suggests that habits do not directly influence behavior and instead its influence occurs through intentions (e.g. Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Trafimow 2000). However, Limayem, Hirt, and Cheung (2007) indicate weaknesses of these studies, including a lack of sound theoretical evidence and imprecise operating models. Many studies have supported the direct relationship between habit and

behavior including research on blood donations (Mittal, 1988) and food consumption (Tuorila and Pangborn, 1988).

Habits may also influence behavior via attitude toward behavior through self-perception mechanisms (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). For example, an individual could perceive their habit of frequently playing with their dog after work as an indicator that they like playing with their dog. As it applies to this study, an individual could perceive their habit of frequently deceiving to increase their likelihood of achieving a positive outcome as an indicator that they have a positive attitude toward deceiving. Additionally, habits impact behaviors automatically. Faking research theorizes a faking response type called reactive responding (Griffith et al. 2011). Although reactive responders may recognize the potential to fake, however, they may not have a coherent strategy for faking. Griffith et al. (2011) suggest that this response type may account for the idiosyncratic item response patterns found in Kuncel and Borneman (2007) and is similar to reflection-impulsivity proposed by Kagan (1965). They propose that this type of responder "endorse[s] items based on the perceived desirability of the item, without regard to self or ideal-applicant schema." They also suggest that this may lead to "clumsy" responding. Based on the automatic processes that lead habits to influence behavior, I propose that reactive responder could be successful if their responses are the outcome of their past deceptive behavior. Although they may not have a clear strategy going into the survey, now that the opportunity to deceive has

presented itself, individuals with high habit of deceiving will reactively respond to the items deceptively.

A positive attitude toward a behavior does not always lead to action. In most scenarios, intentions must be formed prior to the behavior. The more positive the attitudes toward a behavior are, the greater the intentions to act will be. There has been widespread support for intentions as the primary antecedent to behavior (Armitrage & Conner, 2001; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Much research, unsurprisingly, has found that individuals act impulsively or spontaneously (Bagozzi, Yi, Baumgartner, 1990) without intention. However, an individual's intentions may be lower if the individual does not perceive that there are enough resources or ability to execute the behavior. In Bagozzi et al. (1990) research participants did not form strong intentions for their behavior because they did not have motivation or opportunity. Spontaneous behavior is the result of a lack of formulated intentions. When intentions are vague or non-existent, behavior may be directly influenced by attitude toward the behavior. Fakers are no different in that they can be spontaneous or impulsive. Griffith et al. (2011) suggested that impulsivity is an individual difference that would likely yield responding behavior that was highly motivated but ineffective. A behavior requires, at minimum, a formulation of an attitude toward the behavior. And unlike TPB, Eagly and Chaiken's model suggests behavior may not require intention.

Eagly and Chaiken's (1993) model combines many attitude theories for a more inclusive representation of the interaction between attitudes and important

psychosocial factors. Additionally, this model includes variables and hypothesized relationships that may provide better prediction for behaviors that require more than just volition (i.e. opportunity, skill, resources). For these reasons, this model is argued to better predict AFB in comparison to other theories, including the TPB. To better understand why this model may be a better predictor of AFB, I will first review the existing AFB literature that integrates attitude theory.

Attitude Theory in Applicant Faking Behavior Literature

Applicant faking behavior research is increasingly incorporating theory, however, there are still only a few studies that have incorporated attitude theory. Where McFarland and Ryan (2006) were the first to empirically test the TPB as it applies to AFB, Grieve and McSwiggin (2014) expanded on this model with the inclusion of the predictor variable, moral obligation norms.

McFarland and Ryan (2006) tested the integration of TPB with AFB in a two part study. In study one, they hypothesized that attitudes toward AFB, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control would correlate with intention to fake. The procedure used a cross-sectional approach asking all participants to complete the surveys within an hour long survey battery. The researchers found significant relationships for intention to fake with all three variables: attitudes toward AFB (r = .64), subjective norms toward AFB (r = .44), and perceived behavioral control (PBC) toward AFB (r = .47). These three variables explained 45% of the variance in the intention to fake with attitude toward AFB explaining

the most variance, followed by PBC. This was the first empirical study to provide support for TPB as a predictor of intention to fake.

Although study 1 was an important and novel finding, study 2 aimed to make up for its limitations by restricting the susceptibility to common method bias and incorporating AFB in addition to the intention to fake. Study two asked participants to take the personality measure in an honest condition and a condition where they were asked to take the survey as if applying for a real job. All of the predictor variables were administered at least one week in advance. Applicant faking behavior was measured using a social desirability measure and by subtracting the score received in the honest condition from the score received in the applicant condition. Study 2 found that that attitude toward AFB, PBC, and subjective norms were significant predictors of intention to fake, explaining a combined 57% of the variance. Both measures of AFB were related to intentions to fake. Additional path analysis indicated the integration of TPB has good fit. This analysis did not support subjective norm as a significant predictor of intention to fake.

Study two was an improvement from study one in regards to its limitations; however, it is not without limitations of its own. Mainly, study two was conducted in a lab and therefore may not be generalizable to real-life applicant scenario effects. McFarland and Ryan did conduct statistical comparison to real life applicant responding and found it comparable. Even with this support, real job applicant data would add to their support found for TPB in this study.

Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) combined research from Snell et al. (1999) and McFarland and Ryan (2000; 2006) to develop a new model of AFB. Similar to McFarland and Ryan's (2006) findings, they found support for the integration of TPB with AFB. Mueller-Hanson et al. combined PBC, perceived subjective norms, and perceived importance of AFB (in replace of attitudes toward AFB) to create a single antecedent to intentions to fake, called perceptions of the situation. Applicant faking behavior was operationalized as the difference score between an honest condition and a simulated applicant condition, where participants were asked to pretend they are applying for their dream job. Using structural equation modeling, they found significant path coefficient between perceptions of the situation and intentions to fake (.99, $p < .01$). Findings also supported McFarland and Ryan (2006) with a significant path coefficient (.7, $p < .01$) between intentions to fake and AFB. Also significantly related to intentions to fake were conscientiousness and emotional stability. These findings demonstrate that intentions to fake is driven by a complex set of attitudes and personal characteristics. With the strongest support coming from perceptions of the situation and intentions to fake, this study supports McFarland and Ryan's (2006) suggestion that there is potential value in manipulating perceptions and intentions to decrease AFB prior to non-cognitive measurement in the application process.

The findings suggest that AFB is, at least partially, a conscious and pre-planned attempt to present oneself in a favorable light within the application process. This study, however, did not test whether any of the variables directly

impact AFB. There is significant AFB research that would suggest that this relationship may exist because some fakers are more spontaneous in their AFB (Griffith et al. 2011). Such relationships within attitude centric AFB models remain untested. Another weakness of Mueller-Hanson et al. (2007) was the lab setting with student participants. This may inaccurately portray the real-life applicant scenario. This is a weakness found throughout existing AFB research and is addressed in his dissertation.

Research conducted by Grieve and McSwiggan (2014) extends the conversation started by McFarland and Ryan (2006) by expanding the application of TPB in AFB research. Grieve and McSwiggan tested moral obligation norm, or morality, as an additional factor to predict intention to fake. Morality has been proposed theoretically as a valuable predictor of intention to fake (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland and Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999). Grieve (2012) was one of the first to test it empirically, using honest-humility as a proxy, and found support for it as a significant predictor of AFB over and above personality variables. Upon the inclusion of other variables (e.g. psychopathy), however, the prediction value was insignificant. Questioning honesty-humility as a sufficient proxy for morality, Grieve and McSwiggan hypothesized that moral obligation norm concerning AFB and ethical position (idealistic and relativistic) would significantly predict AFB. Moral obligation norm has been found to significantly predict value-laden behaviors over and above TPB variables (Connor & Armitage, 1998). We would expect a low moral obligation to avoid faking to be related to greater faking.

Ethical Position is conceptualized as an individual's moral orientation that influences decision making based on what's right and wrong (Schlenker, 2008). Ethical position consists of ethical idealism and ethical relativism. High idealism is the belief that there are universal ethical rules that should be followed in all situations (e.g. "Thou shall not lie") whereas high relativism considers the decision relative to the context (e.g. "Thou shall not lie, unless it's subjectively beneficial to do so"). In the context of AFB, individuals high in idealism would be less likely to fake because they would consider that lying should never be acceptable, even if they knew they would not get caught and it would give them a better chance to get the job. High relativists, on the other hand, may more deeply consider the context and allow that to influence their morally based decision making. Grieve and McSwiggan conceptualize and analyze these constructs as mutually exclusive. It should be noted, however, that these constructs were originally proposed in a four-fold classification matrix consisting of Situationalists (high idealism, high relativism), Absolutionists (high idealism, low relativism), Subjectivists (low idealism, high relativism), and Exceptionalists (low idealism, low relativism). Grieve and McSwiggan's research did not incorporate this classification scheme.

Using a cross-sectional approach Grieve and McSwiggan used hierarchal multiple regression to find that the combination of attitude, perceived behavioral control and subjective norm accounted for 52% of the variability in intention to fake. Attitude and perceived behavioral control were significant predictors of intention to fake, however, subjective norm was not. The weak support for

subjective norms' lack of predictive value is consistent with past research in regards to dishonest behavior, including cheating, shoplifting, lying (Beck & Ajzen, 1991), and AFB (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). In step 2, moral obligation accounted for an addition 12% of variability and was a significant individual predictor of intention to fake. This support is consistent with past findings for morals on value-laden behaviors (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Nemme & White, 2010). Idealistic and relativistic ethical positioning did not add incremental validity in Step 3, as neither were significant predictors of intention to fake. As hypothesized, at the bivariate level, ethical idealism was significantly negatively correlated with intention to fake. However, ethical relativism was not significantly correlated. The entire model explained 66% of variance, R=.82, R^2=.67, F (6, 211) = 70.89, p=.001, (adjusted R^2 = .659). Grieve and McSwiggan's research provide further support for the use of TPB in AFB theory. They established empirical support for a measure of morality as a predictor of intention to fake. Although ethical idealism and relativism did not account for significant variability in attention to fake above and beyond TPB variables, a significant individual correlation did exist for ethical idealism on intention to fake. This research provides support for TPB and partial support for morality, however, like studies before it, uses a lab-based methodology.

As previously reviewed, the anticipatory outcomes outlined in the Attitude-Behavior model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) are predicted to operate by expectancy-value frameworks (Vroom, 1964). This framework is most recently applied from Ellingson and McFarland's (2011) proposed VIE theory. VIE theory argues that

applicants behavior is determined based on three proximal factors: valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. From a faker's perspective, valence is the belief that AFB yields desirable outcomes including those that come with a new job. Instrumentality is the belief that AFB is required to score well on the measure and that scoring well will result in winning the job opportunity. Lastly, expectancy is the belief that the applicant can fake successfully and therefore, can increase their scores. These components most closely with align with utilitarian outcomes from this dissertation. Ellingson & McFarland's research called for empirical research to support their theory and examining utilitarian outcomes may be a valuable initial exploration to warrant continued research in VIE.

The AFB research has largely supported TPB prediction value for AFB. However, the amount of research in this area remains minimal. Further research is needed to fully understand the relationships between the variable make-up of TPB and AFB. Additionally, research that examines this relationship in a real applicant setting will provide additional validity to our understanding of the relationship.

Method Overview

To test the below hypotheses, a two phase methodology was used to collect within-subjects data. In phase 1, the motivated condition, participants applying to a large retail organization completed an application that includes a 20-item Summated Conscientiousness Scale (SCS); adapted from the Customer Service Conscientiousness Scale utilized by Peterson et al., 2009. Upon completion of the

application process, participants were asked to volunteer for an independent research study.

Those who volunteered participated in phase 2, the research condition. Four to eight weeks after the completion of their application, participants received a link the research condition's measures through email. The non-motivated condition's measures included the SCS from phase 1, as well all additional measures used in this study. Participants were instructed to answer as honestly as possible. The scores from the SCS on phase 1 and 2 were used to determine the extent of within person faking. For a detailed review of the procedure, see the *Method* section below.

Hypotheses Overview

This dissertation expands on past integrations of attitude and AFB theory with a focus on Eagly and Chaiken's (1991) composite model of the attitude-behavior relationship. Below I summarize the hypotheses associated with Figure 1.

Habit

Habits are defined as behaviors that are mostly automatic and do not require much conscious thought to activate. Habits have been shown to both directly and indirectly impact behavior (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). Habits of deception have the potential to impact AFB indirectly via attitudes toward AFB through self-perception mechanisms. Applicants who have a history of consistently being deceptive will more positively evaluate AFB on a selection measure.

Hypothesis 1a: Habit of deception will positively predict attitude toward AFB such that the greater the habit of deception, the more positive the attitude toward AFB.

Habit has been demonstrated as directly impactful on behavior that is relatively less volitional. There is support that aspects of AFB are less volitional and more automatic. AFB research has supported a type of faker that is more spontaneous or impulsive and demonstrate "reactive" response patterns (Griffith et al., 2011). A reactive responder may potentially be acting in response to their established habit for deceiving. Applicants low in integrity would not feel pressure to be honest in a situation like AFB (Goffin and Boyd, 2009) which may remove hesitation to act in accordance with past deceptive behaviors. Unlike, Griffith et al.'s (2011) suggestion that reactive responding would be unsuccessful at faking, this study suggests that an individual with an established habit for deceiving would respond reactively but also successfully.

The act of being deceptive is common and the constant practice of it results in automatic manifestation (Smith, 2004). Habit has widespread support for its direct influence on behavior (Ouellette & Wood, 1998).

Hypothesis 1b: Habit of deception will demonstrate a statistically significant positive relationship with AFB such that the greater the habit of deception, the greater the AFB.

Attitude toward Personality Measures for Selection

Eagly and Chaiken (1993) define attitude toward targets as evaluations of targets of behavior. Ekman (1992) defined deception as "a deliberate choice to mislead a *target* without giving any notification of the intent to do so." When an individual interacts with an attitude object, that individual automatically accesses evaluations toward the attitude target (Fazio, 1995). It is not only important to consider the attitude toward *the act* of deception, we need to observe the attitude toward *the target* that is being deceived. An attitude toward a target does not have direct influence on behavior, it may influence behavior via multiple mediators including attitude toward behavior.

In the AFB scenario, an applicant's target is the personality measure. As many as 74% of applicants believe that other applicants use deception on personality measures (English et al., 2005). Crittenden, Hanna, and Peterson (2009) explain that a major reason why people cheat is due to the perception that many others are doing it. This was supported from Graham et al (1994) whose research demonstrates that college students who thought a large number of students cheat were more likely to have cheated themselves. Within the AFB literature, Snell (1999) concluded that perceptual factors, notably the perceived frequency which other's fake, is a key motivational factor for AFB. It is suggested that less favorable views of personality measures, such as the belief that most people fake on them, is related to more favorable attitude toward AFB.

Hypothesis 2: Attitude toward applicant personality measures will negatively predict attitude toward AFB such that the more favorable the attitude toward personality measures, the more unfavorable the attitude toward AFB.

Anticipatory Outcomes

Utilitarian outcomes are the rewards and punishments that are anticipated to result from the behavior. In Theory of Planned behavior, utilitarian outcomes make up the perceived behavioral outcomes. Utilitarian outcomes have been supported correlating with attitudes of behavior (e.g. Guo, Xiao, & Tang, 2009). In the faking scenario, applicants will weigh the likelihood that AFB will be successful (or go unpunished) and the value of increasing their chances to be selected. Faking research has shown the ability to influence this internal "weighing" through warnings (Dwight & Donovan, 2003) and using verifiable items related to applicants' experiences (Klein & Owens, 1965).

Utilitarian outcomes are most similar to the components of VIE theory (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests the more an individual perceives participating in a behavior will lead to positive outcomes, the more that individual will be motivated to behave. Utilitarian outcomes are expected to influence an individual's attitude toward AFB.

Hypothesis 3: Utilitarian outcomes of AFB will positively predict attitude toward AFB such that the more positive the perception of utilitarian outcomes, the more positive the attitude toward AFB.

The second anticipatory outcomes is normative outcomes: the expected approval or disapproval of significant others in relation to the behavior of interest. Research supports that when individuals perceive that significant others would approve of a behavior, that individual is more likely to engage in that behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Although highly supported in attitude research, the interaction between normative outcomes and attitude toward behavior has not been explored in AFB research.

> Hypothesis 4a: Normative outcomes of AFB will positively predict attitude toward AFB such that the more positive the perception of normative outcomes, the more positive the attitude toward AFB.

This second hypothesis regarding social norms has been well supported in both attitude and AFB literature (Ajzen, 1991; McFarland & Ryan, 2006).

> Hypothesis 4b: Normative outcomes of AFB will demonstrate a statistically significant positive relationship with intention to fake such that the more positive the perception of normative outcomes, the greater the intention to fake.

Idealistic Ethical Position

The final exogenous variable, and last of the three anticipatory outcomes suggested by Eagly and Chaiken's attitude-behavior model, is self-identity outcomes. Ethical positioning can be used to understand the likelihood an individual may consider behaving based on their moral self-concept and can be used as a measure of an individual's self-identity outcomes (Solinger et al., 2008).

An individual who determines their actions based on a strict, no deception ethical code is less likely to fake than an applicant who believes that ethics and morals can and should be malleable based on the situation. Therefore, it is suggested that individuals with an idealist self-concept will be more likely to have negative perceptions of faking and have lower intentions to do so if they are more of an idealist than a realist. To this point, ethical positioning has only been tested by Grieve and McSwiggan (2014) and found inconsistent support.

Hypothesis 5a: Idealistic ethical position will negatively predict attitude toward AFB such that the greater the idealistic position, the more unfavorable the attitude toward AFB.

Hypothesis 5b: Ethical positioning will demonstrate a statistically significant negative relationship with intention to fake such that the greater the idealistic positioning, the lower the intention to fake.

Attitude toward Applicant Faking Behavior

Attitude toward behavior relationship with the intention to behave has been well supported for decades (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). This relationship has also been well supported in AFB research (Grieve & McSwiggan, 2014; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland and Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, Thornton, 2006).

Hypothesis 6a: Attitude toward AFB will positively predict intention to fake such that the more favorable the attitude toward AFB, the greater the intention to fake.

As previously reviewed from the Bagozzi and Yi (1989), it is not uncommon that individuals will act more spontaneously and without intention because they lack the motivation, resources, or opportunity. We have also seen from Griffith et al. (2011) that fakers may act similarly. In this scenario, Eagly & Chaiken (1993) suggest that an attitude toward behavior can directly impact the behavior and can bypass the intention to behave.

> Hypothesis 6b: Attitude toward AFB will demonstrate a statistically significant positive relationship with AFB such that the more favorable the attitude toward AFB, the greater the AFB.

Intention to Fake

Intention to behave has been well-supported as the primary determinant of behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). This relationship has also been well supported in AFB research (Grieve & McSwiggan, 2014; McFarland & Ryan, 2001; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006).

> Hypothesis 7: Intention to fake will positively predict AFB such that the greater the intention to fake, the greater the AFB.

Method

Participants

This study analyzed data collected from a larger research effort conducted by the Applicant Response Behavior (ARB) research team at the Florida Institute of Technology. The data set from this larger research effort consisted of

participants who were job applicants of a large United States retail organization. The applicants were applying for various positions (i.e. customer service, sales, service technician, warehouse, and clerical/administrative). The applicants completed an online battery of assessments administered by a third-party selection consulting firm that provides solutions for personnel selection. The ARB research team worked with the consulting firm and their client retail organization to develop two-phase research approach (see *Procedures* below for details). Upon completion of the online battery, applicants were asked if they are interested in volunteering to participate in an independent research study. The consulting firm provided the research study data for those applicants who agreed to participate in the research study.

In total, 7,740 applicants indicated that they were willing to participate in the independent research study at a later date. This sample of individuals was contacted by the researchers four to eight weeks after completing the initial online battery and provided a link to complete a second set of assessments. Of the 7,740 applicant who agreed to participate, 419 (5.4%) completed the second set of assessments.

To demonstrate that the final sample (N=419) did not respond significantly different from the initial applicant group (N=7,740), we compared their Summated Conscientiousness Scale (SCS) scores. The initial applicant group and the final sample had similar means (110.37 and 111.88, respectively) and standard deviations (8.81 and 8.09, respectively). However, an independent-samples t-test

suggested that mean SCS scores from the two groups were significantly different, t(7738) = 1.00, p = .000. Although the d-effect size (.17) suggests minimal differences between the groups, the results of the t-test and low response rate are discussed as limitations in the *Discussion* section.

Among the 419 responses, 46 were screened out of the database due to: (1) failure to pass an attention assessing manipulation check, (2) providing formulaic response patterns, or (3) being an outlier on any measure. The final sample consisted of 373 participants with ages ranging from 18 to 77 and a mean of 34.98. The participants consisted of 53.5% (N=191) male, 44.5% (N=159) female, and 2.0% (N=7) not specified. The ethnicity of the participants included 59.1% (N = 211) White/Caucasian, 20.2% (N = 72) Black/African American, 7.8% (N = 28) Latino(a)/Hispanic, 7.6% (N = 36) other, and 5.3% (N = 19) not specified. As an indication of this sample having high job search experience, 91.1% had applied to at least on other job in the prior two months with 44.1% having applied to 11 or more.

Procedures

To test this study's hypotheses, the methodology used by Griffith et al. (2007) was implemented. In phase 1, the motivated condition, participants completed an assessment battery that included the Summated Conscientiousness Scale (SCS). Upon completion of the application process, participants were asked to volunteer for an independent study conducted by a research team at Florida Institute of Technology. These applicants were incentivized to volunteer with an

entry into a raffle for one of several cash prizes up to a $1000 grand prize. If applicants agreed to participate, they were asked to provide their first and last names, as well as the email address at which they were contacted by the researchers for phase 2. The names, emails, and SCS data was provided to the research team by the consulting firm for only those individuals who agreed to participate in phase 2.

Phase 2, the non-motivated condition, was implemented four to eight weeks following phase 1 to minimize practice effects. Participants were emailed a link to a new battery of items, including the SCS items which were scattered among the battery to disguise that this was the same measure from Phase 1. After consenting to take part in the study, participants were taken to a webpage which presented specific instructions to respond honestly to all assessment items. After completing the personality inventory, participants were asked to provide basic demographic information such as age, gender, ethnic background, and work experience.

This two phased, within-subjects data, has be described as the "gold standard" (Ryan & Boyce, 2006). This design permits observation of individual differences in responding to personality measures in motivated and unmotivated scenarios. This design does not require measurement of social desirability as a proxy for AFB; a method which has been demonstrated as ineffective (Peterson et al., 2011).

Measures

Applicant Faking Behavior. Applicant faking behavior (AFB) was operationalized as a change score between the participants' SCS scores in the

applicant condition (Phase 1), and their scores under instructions to respond honestly (Phase 2). Specifically, each participant's honest score was subtracted from their applicant score for each personality construct to obtain a continuous measure that represented "the amount of faking". This procedure has been widely used (Ellingson et al., 2007; McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003) and served as a means of creating a continuous variable to be used in the analyses.

Attitude toward AFB. This measure was used in Mcfarland & Ryan (2000) where it was reported with an internal reliability of .86. It is a five item survey with a 5-point semantic-differential-type response scales including, good-bad, pleasant-unpleasant, foolish-wise, useful-useless, and unattractive-attractive in response to the statement, "Use the following scales to describe your views of applicant faking behavior."

Attitudes toward Target. This measure from Rogelberg et al. (2001), who reported a reliability of .9, was slightly modified to update the target to be personality measures. This measure consists of nine items and uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A sample item is, "applicant personality measures are useful ways to gather information."

Conscientiousness. The SCS is the scale used to measure conscientiousness by Peterson et al. (2009). It is comprised of twenty items and uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Peterson et al. (2007) reported an internal consistency reliability of .91.

Idealistic Ethical Position. Forsyth's (1980) Idealistic Ethics Position Questionnaire consists of 10 items. The response scale is a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Internal reliabilities are good, with Cronbach's α of .88 for ethical idealism. A sample item is, "if an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done."

Intention to Fake. Intention to fake was used in Grieves and McSwiggan (2014) where it demonstrated good internal reliability with Cronbach's α of .88. It is comprised of three items and uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A sample item includes, "I intend to fake on future applicant personality measures."

Self-Report Habit Index. The Self-Report Habit Index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) has been altered to measure habit of deception. It consists of twelve items and a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Internal reliabilities are good, with Cronbach's α ranging from .89 to .91 (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). A sample item is, "being deceptive is something I do frequently."

Subjective Norm of AFB. The subjective norm for faking behavior was used in McFarland & Ryan (2000). It is a five item survey with a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A sample item includes, "Most other applicants fake on the applicant personality measures."

Utilitarian Outcomes of AFB. This measure consists of three items with a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample

item includes, “I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will yield good results for me.” It has been adapted for faking from other studies including Eagly and Chaiken (1993).

Analyses

Descriptive statistics were analyzed for all variables including means and standard deviations. In addition, all study scales were examined for internal consistency utilizing Cronbach’s alpha and all study variables were analyzed to detect bivariate correlations.

Data relating to the study hypothesis were tested using structural equation modeling (SEM) using IBM SPSS AMOS Version 24. Path analysis was used to assess all hypotheses simultaneously. Assumptions for SEM were met and Maximum Likelihood estimation was applicable.

The model tested (Figure 2) consists of one outcome variable (AFB) and 7 other latent variables including 5 exogenous (habit of deception, attitude toward applicant personality measures, utilitarian outcomes of AFB, Normative outcomes of AFB, and Ethical Positioning) and 3 endogenous variables (Attitude Toward AFB, Intention to Fake, and AFB). When modeling indicators, a choice can be made to use single item indicators, or indicators comprised of several individual items. These multi-item indicators are often referred to as item parcels, and may be more reliable than single item indicators (Hall, Snell, & Foust, 1999). Due to a lower number of items, the following latent variables in the current study were modeled with indicators consisting of single items: Normative Outcomes of AFB

(five indicators), Utilitarian Outcomes of AFB (three indicators), Attitude toward AFB (five indicators), and Intention to Fake (three indicators). Given a larger number of items, the following constructs have indicators consisting of item parcels: Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures, Ethical Position, and Self-Report Habit Index. All items were randomly assigned into parcels. Random assignment method is supported by past research (e.g. Hall et al., 1999).

First, a CFA was conducted to assess the measurement model fit and observed variable factor loadings. Goodness of fit was evaluated using the following indices and thresholds as defined by Hu and Bentler (1999): Goodness of Fit (GFI > .95), Adjusted Goodness of Fit (AGFI > .80), Comparative Fit Index (CFI > .90), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMS < .09), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA <.05). Following the CFA, the structural model was assessed for good fit.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

The data was cleaned and screened. There were no missing data because all items were required. First, 41 cases were removed for failure to pass the manipulation check. Second, three cases were removed for acquiescent responding which were flagged for any participant who used the same Likert point for more than 90% of their responses. Lastly, to examine outliers, raw scores for all measures were converted into z-scores. A case was assessed for removal if any z-

score was greater than 3.29 or less than -3.29 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In all, 46 cases were removed, resulting in a final sample size of 373.

Next, scale level outliers were assessed, and an assessment of normality was conducted. Analysis indicated significant kurtosis values (above 2.00 or below -2.00) for 39 of the 87 items and skewness for 19 of the 87 items (George & Mallery, 2010). Upon further examination, few extreme instances of skewness and kurtosis were observed. It is not uncommon to find non-normal data in social sciences (Bentler & Chou, 1987) and structural equation modelling is relatively robust to violations of normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Nevertheless, parcel development may partially resolve non-normality as items that are aggregated or averaged often reduce the extreme influence of any one item. Parcels were created for the following measures: Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures, Idealistic Ethical Positioning, and Habit of Deception. Each measure contained three parcels consisting of randomly assigned items. This random assignment method is supported by past research (e.g. Hall et al., 1999). Once the item parcels were established, further examination revealed only two parcels remained with significant kurtosis. Both parcels were indicators of Habit of Deception. We retained this variable and watched it closely throughout all remaining analyses and no additional concerns emerged. This limitation is discussed further in the *Limitations and Future Research* section. The kurtosis and skewness values for all items and parcels can be seen in Table 6.

Next, internal consistencies were assessed using Nunnally's (1978) recommendation for acceptable internal consistency of $\alpha > .70$. All scales demonstrated acceptable reliabilities. Next, descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and correlations between all study variables were analyzed (See Table 1).

Additionally, the percentage of fakers were calculated using the accepted method described in Peterson et al. (2011). The

Following a review of the descriptive statistics and tests for assumptions, the measurement model (See Figure 6) was developed in IBM SPSS AMOS Version 24 to conduct the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). In this model and in the models described below, we have seven latent variables indicated as ovals. Additionally we chose to represent AFB as an observed variable rather than a latent variable. This observed variable was calculated as the difference between the SCS composite scores of Phase 1 and Phase 2. Therefore, in the models, AFB is represented as a rectangle without indicator variables. Although not elaborated on in this study, another model was assessed with AFB as a latent variable with indicators as the different scores of the conscientious measures (See Figure 10). Composite Reliability (CR), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) were analyzed to investigate convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

Composite Reliability is a reliability estimator that is commonly calculated during SEM analysis. Composite Reliability does not receive the criticisms that coefficient alpha receives of being lower bound and underestimating. It should be

noted, however, that although the meta-analyses conducted by Peterson and Kim (2013) support the notion that CR may be a better estimator of reliability, the practical difference between the two may be inconsequential. Nevertheless, analysis revealed significant reliability for all measures as evidenced by each measure's CR exceeding .7 (Hair et al., 2010).

Convergent and discriminant validity were then assessed. In structural equation modelling, convergent validity refers to the degree to which a latent variable is well measured by its indicators and discriminant validity is the degree to which measures of different latent variables are unrelated in a hypothesized model. The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) is a strict measure of convergent validity. The AVE for this model indicates there is established convergent validity (AVE > .5; Hair et al., 2010) for all measures with the exception of Normative Outcomes (AVE = .34). The lack of convergent validity for Normative Outcomes indicates that the latent variable is not well explained by its observed indicators. This limitation for the Normative Outcomes Measure and is discussed further in the *Limitations and Future Research* section.

Discriminant validly is supported when the square root of the AVE for each variable is greater than any of its inter-factor correlations (Hair et al., 2010). This assessment indicated potentially insufficient discriminant validity between Utilitarian Outcomes and Normative Outcomes. This insufficiency suggest that the parent latent factor may be better explained by variables outside of its own

observed indicators. This validity insufficiency is also discussed in the *Limitations and Future Research* section. For variable validity statistics, see Table 2.

A typical research concern when using self-report measures is Common Method Bias (CMB). A conservative Common Latent Factor (CLF) approach was taken to measure CMB (Podsakoff et al., 2003). A CFA was estimated with and without a CLF to determine if large differences exist among the standardized regression weights between the competing models. Some differences greater than .20 were observed among the standardized regression weights within the Normative Outcomes and Utilitarian Outcomes measures. Although some evidence of CMB exists, it is possible that some of the variance partialed by the CLF may be substantive shared variance that is construct relevant. Therefore, the results reported below are not common method bias corrected. However, a second model was computed where the CLF was retained. This model is depicted in Figure 7 and fit statistics can be found in Table 4.

Next I will summarize the model fit indices using thresholds recommendations from Hu and Bentler (1999). The overall model fit was analyzed utilizing Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Table 3 shows the results of the goodness of fit indices. The Chi-squared value for fit was significant, χ^2 (272) = 536.65, p <.001 suggesting a lack of fit between the hypothesized model and the data set. The chi-squared test, however, is a statistically powerful test and sensitive to large sample size and a large amount of parameters. For this reason, researchers agree that the analysis of fit should be based on multiple indices (Byrne, 2001;

Kline, 2005) including those examined in this study: Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). These indices are summarized below.

The GFI and AGFI are alternative measures of chi-square and therefore measure the fit of the hypothesized model compared to the covariance matrix. A value of 1.00 suggests perfect fit. The recommended values for fit are to exceed .90 and .8 respectively. Unlike GFI, AGFI corrects for the number of parameters to avoid overfitting. However, both measures are affected by sample size. The GFI (.90) and AGFI (.87) indicate good fit.

The CFI compares the fit of the hypothesized model to the null model and is relatively insensitive to sample size compared to other fit statistics (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The recommended value for CFI is at least .95 and therefore suggests good fit for the hypothesized model (CFI = .95). Values closer to 1 are considered to be of better fit.

The SRMR is a measure of absolute fit with zero indicating perfect fit. This measure is not biased by the number of parameters. The recommended value for SRMR is less than .08, indicating the hypothesized model has good fit (SRMR = .04).

The recommended value for RMSEA is less than .05. The scale ranges from zero to one with smaller values indicating better fit. This index compares the observed covariance matrix per degree of freedom with the hypothesized

covariance matrix. The RMSEA, then, accounts for model complexity and is one of the fit indices that is least biased by sample size (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). The RMSEA (.05) for the hypothesized model indicates mediocre fit.

In summary, the pattern of results from all fit indices suggests an overall good model fit.

Structural Model Analysis

The Structural model was developed in AMOS (See Figure 8). The assessment of fit indicated good model fit: χ^2 (279) = 563.16, p <.001; GFI = .90; AGFI = .87; CFI = .95; SRMS = .04; RMSEA = .05 (see table 5). The variance predicted of our dependent variables is similar to those in other studies (e.g. McFarlan & Ryan, 2006). Our exogenous variables explained 28% of the variance in Attitude Toward AFB; Normative outcomes, Attitudes toward AFB and Idealism predicted 76% of the variance in Intention to Fake; and Habit, Intention to Fake, and Attitude toward Faking predicted 16% of the variance in AFB. Indirect effects are provided in Table 7).

Hypothesis Testing

IBM SPSS AMOS Version 24 was used for this analysis as well. The well-fitting structural model was used to evaluate all hypothesized relationship through path analysis. We examined the causal paths in the analyzed structural model. In the next section, I lay out each hypothesis and provide the summary of the relationship's magnitude, direction, and significance.

H_{1a}: Habit of Deception will positively predict Attitude toward AFB such that the greater the Habit of Deception, the more positive the Attitude toward AFB. Habit of Deception did not have a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.09, p = n.s).

H_{1b}: Habit of Deception will demonstrate a statistically significant positive relationship with AFB such that the greater the Habit of Deception, the greater the AFB. Although trending in the right direction, Habit of Deception did not have a positive direct effect on AFB (Standardized Coefficient = .04, p = n.s).

H_2: Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures will negatively predict Attitude toward AFB such that the more favorable the Attitude toward Personality Measures, the more unfavorable the Attitude toward AFB. Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures had a negative direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.15, $p < .05$).

H_3: Utilitarian Outcomes of AFB will positively predict Attitude toward AFB such that the more positive the perception of Utilitarian Outcomes, the more positive the Attitude toward AFB. Utilitarian Outcomes did not have a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.14, p = n.s).

H_{4a}: Normative Outcomes of AFB will positively predict Attitude toward AFB such that the more positive the perception of Normative Outcomes, the more positive the Attitude toward AFB. Normative Outcomes had a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = .43, $p < .05$).

H_{4b}: Normative Outcomes of AFB will demonstrate a statistically significant positive relationship with Intention to Fake such that the more positive the perception of Normative Outcomes, the greater the Intention to Fake. Normative Outcomes had a positive direct effect on Intention to Fake (Standardized Coefficient = .80, $p < .05$).

H_{5a}: Idealistic Ethical Position will negatively predict Attitude toward AFB such that the greater the Idealistic Position, the more unfavorable the Attitude toward AFB. Although trending in the right direction, Idealistic Ethical Position did not have a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.09, p = n.s.).

H_{5b}: Idealistic Ethical position will demonstrate a statistically significant negative relationship with Intention to Fake such that the greater the Idealistic Position, the lower the Intention to Fake. Idealistic Ethical Position had a negative direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.12, $p < .05$).

H_{6a}: Attitude toward AFB will positively predict Intention to Fake such that the more favorable the Attitude toward AFB, the greater the Intention to Fake. Attitude toward AFB did not have a positive direct effect on Intention to Fake (Standardized Coefficient = -.04, p = n.s.).

H_{6b}: Attitude toward AFB will demonstrate a statistically significant positive relationship with AFB such that the more favorable the Attitude toward AFB,

the greater the AFB. Attitude toward AFB had a positive direct effect on AFB (Standardized Coefficient = .20, $p < .05$).

H_7: Intention to Fake will positively predict AFB such that the greater the Intention to Fake, the greater the AFB. Intention to Fake had a positive direct effect on AFB (Standardized Coefficient = .44, $p < .05$).

Discussion

Applicant faking behavior is a pervasive and vexing challenge for selection professionals who utilize personality measures to make important business decisions. To uncover the best methods for preventing, detecting, and managing AFB, practitioners and researchers need to have a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the phenomenon and the dynamics of its antecedents. Over the past two decades, the field has seen substantial progress regarding theory development and utilization of consistent rigorous methodologies to explore AFB. The intention of this research is to continue the discussion by introducing a novel integration of AFB and attitude theory, and to test that integration using "gold standard" methodology. Specifically, this research used a two-phased within subjects design to test the integration of modern faking theory with the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

The results of this study provided valuable insights into the dynamics between potential antecedents of applicant faking behavior. Three conclusions in particular, will be most useful in guiding future research and practice: (1) Habit of Deception, as currently measured, is not a viable direct or indirect antecedent of AFB, (2) in addition to Attitude toward AFB, Attitude toward Personality Measures should be included in the AFB story, and (3) Idealistic Ethical Position, as many previously theorized, is a significant predictor of Intention to Fake. These key findings, as well as all other hypotheses are discussed below.

First, hypotheses 1a and 1b were unsupported such that habit of deception was not a significant predictor of AFB or Attitude toward AFB. A common criticism of the Theory of Planned Behavior was its omissions of key variables including habits. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) added this variable in their expanded model, the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation. They proposed that habits are a key driver of all attitudes and behaviors. In regard to habit's impact on behavior, researchers suggest that habits are developed from past behavior and habit's propensity to automatically trigger behaviors is mostly dependent on the frequency of which that behavior has been performed. One likely reason for the non-significant relationship in the current study is a lack of correspondence between the predictor and outcome variables. Although AFB is considered a form of deception, deception is a much broader term that can describe a multitude of specific actions. In other words, even if we accurately measure a broad Habit of Deception within in an individual, it may not be a strong predictor of the specific act of AFB. Ideally, we would be able to measure one's habit for faking personality measures, however, this is unrealistic given that the opportunities to fake on a personality measure are too few and far in between to establish firm habits around. It should be noted, however, that Grieve (2012) observed that individuals who had any past experience with personality measures had more intention to fake. Therefore, past experience with personality measures should still continue to be explored in future research. Lastly, an individual who often deceives, may not be capable of faking, even if they have a high propensity to attempt faking. Faking is

considered an ability, requiring a certain amount of skill and knowledge to be successful (Snell et al., 1999). Habit then, may be a more appropriate direct predictor of variables that that are less volitional and do not require ability to be successful.

In instances where behaviors are not well learned or are performed in unstable or difficult contexts, habits may influence behavior indirectly (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). It was hypothesized that habits would influence attitude toward AFB through self-perception mechanisms. Again, correspondence may be an issue here. If an individual sees themselves as deceiving often, this doesn't necessarily mean they will have a more positive attitude toward AFB. Another potential reason for the non-significant findings may be that people, in general, have poor self-awareness of the amount that they deceive, and this may have affected the normality of the data and introduced a bias into the analyses. The habit of deception measure was observed to have considerable skewness and kurtosis concerns. This non-normality may have led to a lack of variance and a lower potential for significant findings. The skewness and kurtosis analysis show that the respondents in this survey do not believe they frequently deceive, nor is deception a part of who they are. Research suggests that we think we are honest people who do not lie or cheat as much as we actually do (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2003). The primary reason we convince ourselves of this is to maintain our moral self-concept. This is another indication that people are not reliable at reflecting on their own automatic actions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In sum, although this study could not find a

statistically significant relationship for habits directly or indirectly impacting faking, there is still potential for habits to be a viable driver of AFB, although it may require different measurement techniques. Opportunities for continued examination of Habit of deception is discussed further in the *Limitations and Future Research* section.

Second, as predicted by hypotheses 2, Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures had a negative direct effect on Attitude toward AFB. This supports the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation and the Automatic Processing Model (Fazio, 1986). An attitude toward a target is the evaluation of an entity to which a particular behavior is directed (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In the current context, applicant personality measures were chosen as the target to be measured. Our findings suggested that the more positively an individual evaluated applicant personality measures, the more negatively they evaluated AFB. Fazio suggests that an individual's attitude toward target is highly accessible and automatically activated. Therefore, when an individual is exposed to a personality measure, their attitude toward personality measures is already triggered to influence their attitude toward AFB on that measure. These findings support the notion that there are varying opinions of personality measures and those opinions may influence other key components involved in the prediction of AFB. This finding has direct implications and emphasizes the importance of face-validity of personality measures. Although personality measures have strong empirical validity, they have long held relatively weak face validity (Hogan, Hogan, &

Roberts, 1996) which may lead to negative evaluations of personality measures. These novel findings and the potential influence on research and practice are detailed in the *Practical Implications* as well as the *Limitations and Future Research* sections.

Third, hypothesis 3 was unsupported such that Utilitarian Outcomes did not have a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB. This is one of the most surprising non-significant findings. In this study, Utilitarian Outcomes are the rewards and punishments that are anticipated to results from AFB. In this sample, individuals who believed that AFB will lead to positive outcomes did not have a more positive attitude toward AFB in comparison to those individuals who believed that AFB would not lead to positive outcomes. This result is not supported in past research (e.g. Guo, Xiao, & Tang, 2009; Vroom, 1964). Although utilitarian outcomes has not been utilized in faking research, these results are unsupported in the faking literature with similar constructs such as perceived behavioral control and instrumentality (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Marcus, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Utilitarian outcomes is assessed using an expectancy x value paradigm (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), similar to these constructs. The potential validity concerns may be the reason behind the non-significant result and is discussed further in the *Limitations and Future Research* section.

Fourth, as predicted by hypotheses 4a and 4b, Normative Outcomes had a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB and Intention to Fake. These findings are consistent with those hypothesized in the Composite Model of the Attitude–

Behavior Relation. In this study, normative outcomes are the perceived approval or disapproval of significant others as it pertains to faking on a personality test. Extensive research utilizing the TPB model suggests that when individuals perceive that significant others would approve of a behavior, that individual is more likely to engage in the target behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Across TPB research, the direct effects of normative outcomes typically have relatively low magnitudes, particularly when the behavior of interest is dishonest (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Within the faking literature, to my knowledge, this is the second empirical study to find a significant relationship between normative outcomes and intention to fake. This finding further supports the application of TPB to AFB modelling. This study's findings regarding normative outcomes should be interpreted with caution due to validity concerns which are discussed in more detail in the *Limitations and Future Research* section.

Fifth, hypothesis 5a was unsupported such that Idealistic Ethical Position was not a negative predictor of Attitude toward AFB. However, as predicted by hypothesis 5b, Idealistic Ethical Position had a significant negative relationship with Intention to Fake. These results partially support the Composite Model for Attitude-Behavior Relations. An individual characterized by high idealism determines their actions using the guideline that there are universal ethical rules that should be followed in all situations (including taking personality measures). The results of hypothesis 5a suggest that the extent to which an individual is unwilling to waver from their ethical code is unrelated to attitudes toward AFB. Hypothesis 5b suggests, however, that the extent to which an individual is

unwilling to waver from their ethical code is related to their intention to fake. These results support Grieve and McSwiggan's (2014) and Sieler and Kuncel's (2005) faking related results. Since the early stages of AFB literature, there has been a call for the inclusion of morality or moral code in the study of AFB (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland and Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999) because of its close relation to deception in western culture (Bok, 1978). Now, the inclusion of idealism or an ethical code related variable has gained considerable support in a number of different survey designs, measures, and analyses (e.g., Grieve, 2012; Grieve & McSwiggan, 2014; Sieler & Kuncel, 2005)

Sixth, hypothesis 6a was unsupported, such that Attitude toward AFB did not positively predict Intention to Fake. Respondents in this study with more positive evaluations of AFB were no more likely to intend to fake than were individuals who had more negative evaluations of AFB. This was one of the most surprising results of this study. Attitude toward behavior as a predictor of intention to behave is a well-supported relationship in attitude (Ajzen, 1991) and faking research (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, Thornton, 2006).

Unlike 6a, 6b was supported. Attitude toward AFB demonstrated a significant positive relationship with AFB. This supports the Composite Model of Attitude-Behavior Relation. However, this relationship is unique to AFB literature and traditional TPB literature. Past attitude research has demonstrated that attitudes are better predictors of behaviors when that attitude is held with relatively greater

certainty. In other words, decisive attitudes predict behavior better than weak or inconsistent ones (Borgida & Campbell, 1982; Kraus, 1995). Additionally, attitude-behavior relationships are stronger when they are correspondent (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), and when there is no expectation to discuss their attitudes with others (Leippe & Elkin, 1987). Lastly, the attitude-behavior relationship has been shown to be stronger when attitudes are formed when there was greater motivation to think about the attitude target (Glassman & Albarracin, 2006). In the context of this study, although the concept of faking may be new to many respondents, deception is not. Firstly, participant's attitudes about deception is probably relatively stable, especially at our sample's mean age of 35. Secondly, the correspondence in this research between attitude toward faking and AFB is high. Thirdly, there is no expectation that one would need to or have had shared their attitude toward faking with others. And lastly, as evidenced by the results of hypothesis 2, attitude target is a salient factor that has influence on attitudes toward AFB. This evidence provides support for the findings in this study and demonstrates the value of retaining the attitude toward AFB – AFB relationship in future research.

Lastly, and unsurprisingly, hypothesis 7 correctly predicted that intention to fake had a positive direct effect on AFB. This relationship has garnered extensive support from AFB (e.g. McFarland & Ryan, 2006) and attitude research (Ajzen, 1991). Although faking does require a level of skill to be successful, research has clearly demonstrated that individuals who intend to fake are more likely to successfully fake than those who do not intend to fake.

Practical Implications

Although the primary intent of this study was to test integrated theory, the generalizability of the findings is relatively strong compared to other AFB research because few AFB studies have utilized real applicant data.

This study's findings suggest that applicants may be impacted by their evaluations of personality measures such that applicants who evaluate personality measures more favorably are less likely to fake than those who evaluate personality measures more negatively. As organizations continue to monitor and improve their personality measures' reliability and validity for selection, they should also consider and make efforts to improve face validity more carefully. Additionally, selection measure proctors may educate applicants on the validity of personality measures prior to administration. These methods may increase the favorable evaluations of personality measures among applicants and therefore decrease negative applicant attitudes toward AFB.

The finding that idealistic ethical position impacts intention to fake is further support for the continued use of warnings (Dwight & Donovan, 2002; Schenk & Sullivan, 2010). Based on these novel findings, warnings may be most effective if they elicit recall of applicant's ethical moral code. It is important to note that some research suggests that in certain scenarios, warnings can enhance faking by introducing or making the concept of AFB more salient (Dwight & Donovan, 2002). Further exploration is needed to determine if warning's benefits outweigh the drawbacks.

Lastly, identification of applicant characteristics of fakers may inform selection processes and recruitment. For example, specific questions could be asked during interviews to assess the relevant characteristics of fakers. Additionally, knowledge of the drivers of AFB may influence recruiters and their processes of selecting candidates for nomination.

Limitations and Future Research

A limitation in this study was the low participant response rate in Phase 2 (5.4%). Low response rates may lead to non-response bias, however, a meta-analysis conducted by Groves and Peytcheva (2008) demonstrated that non-response rate is not predictive of the degree of nonresponse bias.

A primary reason for the low response rate was the four to eight week time disparity between Phase 1 and 2. Given this disparity and the non-threatening survey design, it can be assumed that the vast majority of non-responders were passive. Passive non-respondents are those who did not return the survey for contextual reasons (e.g. did not receive the survey, forgot about it, couldn't complete it due to other commitments, etc.; Rogelberg et al., 2003). Bias is not created by passive non-respondents unless the survey constructs assessed are related to the reasons passive non-respondents fail to respond (e.g. workload, business, forgetfulness; Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007). This does not apply to this study and therefore, it may be safe to assume no bias was introduced from passive non-respondents.

The challenge with low response rate is not knowing whether there is a significant difference between responders and nonresponders that would influence the relationships under investigation (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). To determine if a significant difference existed between these two groups, a t-test was utilized to compare responses on the SCS in Phase 1. Although the results were significant, the numerical mean score difference and the effect size (d = .17) was minimal. This minor evidence suggests the differences between the two groups may not have an impact on the relationships investigated although it does suggest that those who responded may be slightly more conscientious. Without additional data available to compare the groups, we must retain this limitation and consider it while interpreting the results of the study. It is important to note, however, that this research design does have a precedent for low response rates (e.g. Arthur, Glaze, Villado, & Taylor, 2010; Peterson et al., 2011) and our rates are comparable to published studies using similar methodologies. Finally, because the remaining sample was overall more conscientious, these respondents would have less opportunity to fake than the population because of our operationalization of AFB. This suggests that the effect sizes observed in this study were attenuated and the final observed estimates were conservative.

Future research should further explore the magnitude of non-respondents within this survey design that are passive and active. Active non-respondent are those who consciously decide not to reply and have a greater potential for introducing systematic response bias. Historically, however, non-respondents

represent such a small portion of the sample that they have no impact on results. Future research could leverage focus groups and interviews with random groups from the population to estimate the proportion of active to passive non-responders. If the results indicate a low proportion, there is little concern for bias. However, if the results indicate active non-respondents upwards to 15%, generalizability may be impacted.

A second potential limitation of this study is the use of difference scores as a measure of faking. There has been criticism for measuring change through difference scores (Edwards, 1994). It has been suggested that difference scores are unreliable. However, there are researchers who have demonstrated that different scores are not necessarily unreliable (e.g. Gollwitzer, Christ, & Lemmer; Tisak & Smith, 1994). McFarland and Ryan (2006) support the use of difference scores using this study's AFB methodology, especially when comparing the alternative of utilizing social desirability scales. Additionally, much research has supported the use of difference scores when participant-by-treatment interaction is expected and when both test measures are reliable (Rogosa, Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982; Tisak & Smith, 1994); which is the case in this study. As recommended by Johns (1981), the reliabilities for the test measures as well as the difference score measure were reported in the *Results* section. All measures demonstrated good reliability (Pre SCS, $\alpha = .9$; Post SCS, $\alpha = .88$; Faking (Difference Scale), $\alpha = .79$).

In addition to unreliability, utilizing difference scores to measure faking constrains the amount of faking an individual can engage in. Specifically, an

individual's magnitude of faking is limited to the range between their response score in the honest phase to the maximum score on the scale (Raymark & Tafero, 2009). Although using difference scores to measure faking is common practice in AFB research (e.g. Griffith et al. 2006; Donovan & Dwight, 2013), additional methodologies for measuring faking should continue to be explored.

A third limitation of this study were the convergent and discriminant validity concerns unveiled during the validity assessment of the CFA for the hypothesized model. Normative Outcomes demonstrated low convergent and divergent validity while Utilitarian Outcomes demonstrated low discriminant validity. As a result, we remain cautious when evaluating the validity of the indicators used for normative and utilitarian outcomes (Farrell, 2009). These results causes interpretation issues for these latent exogenous variables and their hypothesized relationships. For this reason, caution should be taken when interpreting this study's results demonstrating a non-significant direct path between Utilitarian Outcomes and Attitude toward Faking and significant direct paths between Normative Outcomes and Intentions as well as Normative Outcomes and Attitude toward Faking. Future research should revisit the Utilitarian and Normative Outcomes scales for revision opportunities to improve these scales' internal reliability and validity.

A fourth limitation of this study was the potential for common method bias (CMB). Common Method Bias is variance that is attributed to the measurement method instead of to the measurement constructs. With the exception of the Phase 1

CSC measure, all variables were measured at the same time and utilized self-report responding. Therefore, there is initial concern that the observations made in this study were a result of the CMB, rather than the constructs and therefore may influence the direction and magnitude of the relationships (Podsakoff, et al., 2012). Podsakoff et al. (2012) suggest a number of procedural and statistical remedies for CMB. This study incorporated as many procedural remedies as the design permitted, including: proximal and temporal separation; variable scale properties including different Likert scale points (five vs. seven) and formats (Likert vs. semantic differential); improved scale items (e.g. less ambiguous items); and use of positively and negatively framed items. Statistically, this study tested for CMB effects using a CLF approach. With indications of potential CMB, the structural model was also analyzed with the retained CLF factor (See Figure 9; Podsakoff, et al., 2012)

Additional future research should further explore how habit of deception fits into the explanation of AFB if at all. In addition to refining or using different measures, future research should explore habit of deception as a moderator between intent to fake and AFB. Past research has demonstrated habit as a significant moderator between intention and a behavior (Triandis, 1977; Gardner, de Brujin, & Lally, 2011).

One of the most compelling finding of this study was the significant relationship between attitude toward personality measures and attitude toward AFB. Future research should continue to test this relationship to garner additional

support for this finding. Additionally, although personality measures were elected the target for this study, additional targets should be explored (i.e. the organization administering the personality measure). Having a more comprehensive understanding of the influence of targets on AFB has potential to have significant impacts on organizations' approach to mitigate, deter, and manage AFB.

This research was the first to test the hypothesized relationships using a two-phase within-subjects design that measured faking using difference scores incorporating real applicant data. This methodology has been touted as the "gold-standard" of faking research design (Ryan & Boyce, 2006). To reliably test AFB theory and draw logical comparisons across studies, it is recommended that future research strives to utilize this research design. Using this methodology will allow the research area to confidently mount valid evidence that will shape how we interpret and understand AFB.

This study examined many variables that influence AFB with the purpose of increasing our understanding of AFB antecedents. The intent was not to test a comprehensive model of all variables that impact AFB. Future research should leverage this research and continue the AFB antecedent discussion by exploring new variables and retest previously tested ones that may influence AFB. Once a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics between AFB antecedents are understood, research should explore in more depth the most appropriate measures to alleviate the effects of faking.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this study was to introduce and test a new, attitude-focused, theoretical model of AFB, and the findings contribute valuable insights to the faking discussion. As one of the first AFB studies to utilize a within subjects design with real applicant data, the results may provide new context-congruent information to help guide researchers and practitioners. Researchers have called for testing of habits to better understand the automatic processing involved in faking behavior. This study demonstrated habit of deception was not a predictor of faking behavior and that future explorations into the influence of habits should carefully consider its operationalization. Additionally, this study introduced a new variable to the AFB literature, Attitude toward Personality Measures. Results from this study highlighted the potential value for the inclusion of this variable in AFB hypothesis modelling, as well it's consideration in the selection setting to deter AFB. Lastly, this study was the first to find support for idealism as a predictor of intention to fake. This finding is promising for the commonly theorized value of morality as a key factor for predicting individual AFB. In summary, backed by gold-standard testing design, this study provides continued support for the value of integrating attitude theory with AFB and provides unique findings with novel variables that can be leveraged in future AFB theory and considerations for practical application.

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Appendix: Survey Measures

Summated Conscientiousness Scale

On the scale provided, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. In order to be successful, it is necessary for me to set goals.
2. I feel it is important to complete all of the tasks in a project and not cut corners.
3. I work harder than most people do in general.
4. If I can get away with it, I will take an extra break while completing a project. (R)
5. People rely on me to complete duties/tasks.
6. I have set goals for my future.
7. I am usually considered a dedicated individual.
8. I conduct myself in a safe manner at all times.
9. I engage in activities that go above and beyond what I am expected.
10. I accept responsibility for my actions.
11. Items in my work area are neatly organized.
12. I strive for excellence in everything I do.
13. I complete projects from start to finish.
14. I plan activities in advance.
15. It is easy for me to stay focused on challenging tasks.
16. I show that I am responsible to others.
17. Sometimes when I borrow something, I return it broken or damaged. (R)
18. Friends say that I am a trustworthy individual.
19. Being given important tasks is important to me.
20. I delay completing projects if they can be finished tomorrow. (R)

Utilitarian Outcomes

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will yield good results for me
2. I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will bring good outcomes to me
3. I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will be good for me

Attitude toward Target

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I do not like filling out applicant personality measures (R)
2. Applicant personality measures are fun to fill out
3. I enjoy filling out applicant personality measures
4. Applicant personality measures are exciting to fill out
5. I hate filling out applicant personality measures (R)
6. A lot can be learned from information gathered from applicant personality measures
7. Nothing good comes from completing applicant personality measures (R)
8. Applicant personality measures are useful ways to gather information
9. Completing applicant personality measures is a waste of time (R)

Self-Report Habit Index

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Being deceptive is something…

1. I do frequently
2. I do automatically
3. I do without having to consciously remember
4. that makes me feel weird if I do not do it
5. I do without thinking
6. that would require effort not to do
7. that belongs to my daily routine
8. I start doing before I realize I'm doing it
9. I would find hard not to do

10. I have no need to think about doing
11. that's typically "me"
12. I have been doing for a long time

Subjective Norm Concerning Faking Behavior

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Most people who are important to me would look down on me if I faked on an applicant personality measure.
2. Most people whose opinions I value would approve of me faking on an applicant personality measure.
3. It is expected of me that I fake on applicant personality measures.
4. Most other applicants fake on the applicant personality measures.
5. No-one who is important to me would care if I faked on an applicant personality measure.

Attitude toward Faking

Use the following scales to describe your views of applicant faking behavior.

Good	1	2	3	4	5	Bad
Pleasant	1	2	3	4	5	Unpleasant
Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	Wise
Useful	1	2	3	4	5	Useless
Unattractive	1	2	3	4	5	Attractive

Intention to Fake

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I would never fake on an applicant personality measure.
2. I intend to fake on future applicant personality measures.
3. I will make an effort to fake on future applicant personality measures.

Ethical Position

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Completely Disagree	Largely Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Moderately Agree	Largely Agree	Completely Agree

1. People should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree.
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be.
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual.
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
8. The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important concern in any society.
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
10. Moral behaviors are actions that closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action.

Table 1
Correlations and Descriptives

	M	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Normative	10.68	3.59	0.72								
2. Intention-Fake	5.00	2.30	.589**	0.73							
3. Utilitarian	5.63	2.62	.614**	.641**	0.82						
4. Att-Measures	29.12	7.92	-.332**	-.268**	-.338**	0.92					
5. Att-Faking	20.85	5.32	-.401**	-.391**	-.434**	0.09	0.94				
6. Idealism	41.39	5.33	-.203**	-.271**	-.291**	.144**	0.09	0.77			
7. Hab-Deception	20.74	9.15	.261**	.292**	.293**	-0.02	-.251**	-.265**	0.85		
8. Pre-SCS	103.5	10.4	-.43**	-.47**	-.44**	.38**	.18**	.42**	-.33**	.90	
9. Post-SCS	109.3	8.4	-.24**	-.27**	-.29**	.21**	.21**	.31**	-.27**	.60**	.88

Note: Coefficient alphas for measures are reported on the diagonal
$^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p > .05$

Table 2
CFA Reliability and Validity Matrix

	CR	AVE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Intention-Fake	0.77	0.54	0.73						
2. Att-Measures	0.95	0.86	-0.31	0.93					
3. Hab-Deception	0.88	0.71	0.39	-0.06	0.84				
4. Att-Faking	0.94	0.75	-0.46	0.07	-0.27	0.87			
5. Idealism	0.79	0.56	-0.35	0.18	-0.36	0.10	0.75		
6. Utilitarian	0.83	0.61	0.79	-0.36	0.36	-0.46	-0.38	0.78	
7. Normative	0.71	0.34	0.80	-0.40	0.36	-0.50	-0.30	0.82	0.58

Note: Square Root of AVE for measures are reported on the diagonal

Table 3
CFA Model Fit

Fit Measure	Recommended Value	Value for Model
χ^2		536.65
DF		272
p-value	> .05	.00
GFI	> .95	.90
AGFI	> .80	.87
CFI	> .95	.95
SRMR	< .08	.04
RMSEA	< .05	.05

Note: Recommended values based on Hu and Bentler (1999)

Table 4
CFA Model Fit with the CLF retained

Fit Measure	Recommended Value	Value for Model
χ^2		442.19
DF		247
p-value	> .05	.000
GFI	> .95	.92
AGFI	> .80	.86
CFI	> .95	.97
SRMR	< .08	.04
RMSEA	< .05	.05

Note: Recommended values based on Hu and Bentler (1999)

Table 5
SEM Model Fit

Fit Measure	Recommended Value	Value for Model
$\chi 2$		563.16
DF		279
p-value	> .05	.000
GFI	> .95	.90
AGFI	> .80	.87
CFI	> .95	.95
SRMR	< .08	.04
RMSEA	< .05	.05

Note: Recommended values based on Hu and Bentler (1999)

Table 6
Skewness and Kurtosis for All Items and Parcels

Indicator	Skewness	Kurtosis
Post-SCS_1	-1.79	4.59
Post-SCS_2	-1.56	3.87
Post-SCS_3	-0.83	1.29
Post-SCS_4	-0.67	-0.38
Post-SCS_5	-1.53	3.98
Post-SCS_6	-1.14	1.12
Post-SCS_7	-1.07	1.63
Post-SCS_8	-1.11	0.89
Post-SCS_9	-0.75	0.49
Post-SCS_10	-1.94	7.63
Post-SCS_11	-0.93	0.31
Post-SCS_12	-1.19	1.67
Post_SCS_13	-1.10	1.53
Post_SCS_14	-0.98	0.89
Post_SCS_15	-1.21	2.03
Post_SCS_16	-1.36	4.15
Post_SCS_17	-2.85	9.46
Post_SCS_18	-2.38	10.79
Post_SCS_19	-1.31	2.36
Post_SCS_20	-0.78	-0.21
Normative_1	0.92	0.08
Normative_2	1.24	1.10
Normative_3	1.89	3.45
Normative_4	-0.12	-0.16
Normative_5	0.87	-0.06
Intention-fake_1	1.27	0.88
Intention-fake_2	1.72	2.74
Intention-fake_3	2.06	4.74
Utilitarian_1	1.21	0.68
Utilitarian_2	0.75	-0.45
Utilitarian_3	1.26	1.18
Att-Measures_1	0.19	-0.95
Att-Measures_2	0.18	-0.66
Att-Measures_3	0.20	-0.73
Att-Measures_4	0.33	-0.52
Att-Measures_5	-0.04	-0.82
Att-Measures_6	-0.79	0.10
Att-Measures_7	-0.81	0.47
Att-Measures_8	-0.80	0.26
Att-Measures_9	-0.88	0.31
Att-Faking_1	-1.59	1.60
Att-Faking_2	-1.41	1.09
Att-Faking_3	-1.42	0.94
Att-Faking_4	-1.02	-0.21
Att-Faking_5	-1.33	0.86
Idealism_1	-1.88	4.72
Idealism_2	-1.53	2.46
Idealism_3	-1.36	1.77
Idealism_4	-1.80	4.11
Idealism_5	-1.57	3.52
Idealism_6	-2.11	6.10
Idealism_7	0.21	-1.14
Idealism_8	-1.06	1.10

Idealism_9	-0.70	-0.61
Idealism_10	-0.63	-0.10
Hab-Deception_1	2.51	7.47
Hab-Deception_2	2.40	6.73
Hab-Deception_3	2.22	4.75
Hab-Deception_4	2.53	6.09
Hab-Deception_5	2.22	4.66
Hab-Deception_6	2.43	6.12
Hab-Deception_7	3.26	14.23
Hab-Deception_8	2.11	4.54
Hab-Deception_9	2.81	8.81
Hab-Deception_10	0.34	-1.61
Hab-Deception_11	2.89	10.97
Hab-Deception_12	2.45	6.06
Pre-SCS_1	-1.91	6.00
Pre-SCS_2	-3.48	19.34
Pre-SCS_3	-0.88	0.95
Pre-SCS_4	-1.42	0.94
Pre-SCS_5	-1.69	4.84
Pre-SCS_6	-1.41	1.37
Pre-SCS_7	-2.37	11.69
Pre-SCS_8	-1.40	1.45
Pre-SCS_9	-1.55	3.75
Pre-SCS_10	-1.62	0.99
Pre-SCS_11	-1.00	0.19
Pre-SCS_12	-1.34	1.38
Pre-SCS_13	-1.24	0.54
Pre-SCS_14	-0.99	0.92
Pre-SCS_15	-1.60	4.85
Pre-SCS_16	-1.03	-0.15
Pre-SCS_17	-2.88	14.69
Pre-SCS_18	-2.96	17.79
Pre-SCS_19	-1.81	5.21
Pre_SCS_20	-1.60	3.90
P1_Att_meas	-0.04	-0.41
P2_Att_meas	-0.03	-0.26
P3_Att_meas	-0.38	0.16
P1_ideal	-0.29	0.05
P2_ideal	-0.45	-0.38
P3_ideal	-0.42	-0.46
P1_deception	0.65	0.15
P2_deception	2.15	5.93
P3_deception	1.79	3.49

Table 7

Indirect effects for the structural model

	Habit	Idealism	Att-Measures	Utilitarian	Normative	Att-Faking
Intention	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.019	0
Faking	-0.016	-0.068	-0.027	-0.026	0.274	-0.019

Variables with no indirect effects with any other variable were removed from this table

Figure 1

Integrated Model of Applicant Faking Behavior and Attitudes with Hypotheses



Displays the structural model with labels for the hypotheses.

Figure 2

Integrated Model of Applicant Faking Behavior and Attitudes with Prediction Direction



Displays all variables measured in this study path relationship direction

Figure 3

Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)



Figure 4
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985)



Figure 5

Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)



Figure 6
CFA Measurement Model



Figure 7

CFA Measurement Model with the Retained CFL (Common Method Bias Corrected)



Figure 8
Structural Model



Figure 9

Structural Model with CLF retained (CMB corrected measures)



Figure 10
Structural Model with AFB represented as a latent variable